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NOTES & COMMENTS
COMMENTS
REVENUE SHARING: A SIMPLE CURE FOR THE
EXPLOITATION OF COLLEGE ATHLETES
I. INTRODUCTION
Year after year, fans of collegiate athletics flock to stadiums across
the country to pay reverence to their respective athletic teams. These
teams not only provide their supporters with a steady source of
entertainment, but their performance also helps bring notoriety and pride
to the universities they represent. Over the years, the popularity and
marketability of victorious teams have brought enormous sums of money
to their respective universities.' College athletics, especially the so-called
"revenue sports" of men's basketball and football, is now a multi-million
dollar business that is marketed, packaged, and sold in the same manner as
other commercial products.
2
Lost in the pomp and circumstance of traditional rivalries and
growing profits is the exploitation of the most important members of
collegiate sports-the student-athletes. While colleges and universities
continue to reap the monetary benefits generated by these athletes, the
athletes have little hope of receiving even a minute portion of the profits.
This system of inequality is directly based on the strict rules and
regulations promulgated by the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA") that prohibit student-athletes from receiving any form of
monetary compensation, except for athletic scholarships.
3
1. See Stephen M. Schott, Give Them What They Deserve: Compensating the Student-
Athlete for Participation in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 SPORTS LAWS. J. 25, 27 (1996). In
addition to gaining millions of dollars for their respective universities through participation in
football bowl games and the NCAA Basketball Championship, athletic teams also generate
money from alumni donations and increased enrollment. Id.
2. Id.
3. 1997-98 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12, § 12.1.1 (NCAA ed., 1997) [hereinafter
NCAA MANUAL]. Established in 1909, the NCAA seeks to "maintain intercollegiate athletics
as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student
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This Comment contends that athletic scholarships do not adequately
and fairly compensate student-athletes in light of the substantial revenue
they generate for their schools. This Comment also argues that current
NCAA rules prohibiting compensation have various legal defects.4  In
order to avoid these legal deficiencies, while allowing student-athletes to
be properly compensated, this Comment proposes an extensive revenue-
sharing plan that should be imposed on all universities throughout the
country.
Part II discusses the influx of commercialism in present-day
collegiate sports. Part III illustrates how the current NCAA regulations
lead to gross inequalities and a general exploitation of student-athletes.
Part IV examines the legal implications associated with the current NCAA
rules, arguing that the prohibition on student-athlete compensation may
violate federal antitrust laws. Finally, Part V proposes a comprehensive
revenue-sharing plan that would both cure the antitrust violations and
provide equitable compensation to student-athletes. This Comment
concludes that allowing colleges and universities to adopt revenue-sharing
plans to compensate student-athletes will not only allow college sports to
avoid antitrust scrutiny, but will also eliminate the exploitative elements
existing in college sports today.
II. REVENUE EXPLOSION OF COLLEGE SPORTS
To understand how athletes are exploited in collegiate sports, it is
necessary to examine the wide disparities between the revenues generated
by these athletes and the relative compensation received for their
performances. Present-day college athletics is "big business," with two
major "revenue sports," men's basketball and football, generating more
money than any other sport.
5
body .. .[while] retain[ing] a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports." Id. art. 1, § 1.3.1. The NCAA's main goals are to promote amateurism in
collegiate sports and to foster a close connection between sports and education. Id. art. 2, § 2.9.
4. Many commentators have lamented that the NCAA rules and regulations are brought
within the parameters of the Sherman Antitrust Act as violations of antitrust. See, e.g., Note,
Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1299 (1992)
[hereinafter Sherman Act Invalidation]; Christopher L. Chin, Illegal Procedures: The NCAA's
Unlawful Restraint of the Student-Athlete, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1213 (1993); Lee Goldman,
Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 206
(1990); Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REv. 2631
(1996). Also, for a discussion of how current NCAA regulations may violate a student-athlete's
right of publicity, see Vladimir P. Belo, The Shirts Off Their Backs: Colleges Getting Away
With Violating the Right of Publicity, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133 (1996).
5. University athletic departments generally use the revenue generated mainly from men's
basketball and football to subsidize their nonrevenue sports. Schott, supra note 1, at 47.
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A large portion of the revenue generated in men's basketball and
football comes from different playoff systems used to declare a national
champion each year. In college football, a national champion is decided
by coaches and newspaper writers based on the team's performances
throughout the season and in various "bowl games."7 The net income from
all football bowl games in 1993-94 totaled $40.7 million, which was
distributed among those participating universities. College basketball, on
the other hand, crowns its national champion using a single-elimination
tournament usually scheduled toward the middle and end of March. 9 The
net income from this tournament in 1994 was $89 million, which was
distributed among the sixty-four participating Division 110 schools.II
The popularity of college bowl games and the NCAA Men's
Basketball Tournament has produced additional profits from television
revenues.12 Television receipts from the 1993-94 bowl games produced
$36 million.' 3 In addition, CBS currently has an exclusive agreement to
televise the Men's Basketball Tournament through the year 2002 for a
reported $1.7 billion, all of which is distributed among the NCAA member
schools. 
14
These figures result in huge profits for each school. For example,
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") records from the 1994-95 academic year
reveal that each university associated with the Atlantic Coast Conference
("ACC") received an average of $5.64 million in total profits from all
athletic teams.' 5 Likewise, members of the Southeastern Conference
("SEC") received an average of $4.55 million during the same period.
16
Although these totals may appear staggering, they do not account for the
6. Alan Schmadtke, ACC, Especially 'Noles Rank High in Revenues, SuN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Oct. 30, 1996, at 10C.
7. See RICHARD M. CAMPBELL et al., NCAA FOOTBALL OFFICIAL 1997 COLLEGE
FOOTBALL RECORDS BOOK 330 (Ted Breidenthal ed., 1997).
8. Schott, supra note 1, at 27.
9. See GARY K. JOHNsON, NCAA FINAL FOUR: THE OFFICIAL 1997 FINAL FOUR RECORDS
BOOK 191-202 (Stephen R. Hagwell ed., 1997).
10. Schools are divided into different divisions depending on certain performance criterion.
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 20, § 20.02.2 ("Performance criteria include, but are not
limited to, minimum sports sponsorship requirements, minimum scheduling requirements and
minimum game-attendance requirements.").
11. Schott, supra note 1, at 27.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 27 n.8.
14. Peter Finney, If They're to Play, Athletes Need Pay, TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Mar. 12, 1997, at Dl. Over 1000 colleges and universities throughout the country are members
of the NCAA. See Goldman, supra note 4, at 209.
15. Schmadtke, supra note 6, at 10C.
16. Id.
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intangible income produced by contracts with outside sources. 17  Shoe
companies, for example, contract with universities and coaches to have
athletic teams wear their products and logos.1
8
Using the money gained directly and indirectly from the performance
of athletes on the field, colleges and universities have the means to fund
their athletic programs appropriately. However, the college athlete, who is
the primary source of this revenue, receives absolutely no portion of the
profits.' 9  NCAA rules prohibiting college athletes from receiving
compensation breed inequality and exploit the athletes upon whom the
universities depend.
III. NCAA RULES AND REGULATIONS
Despite the huge sums of money college athletics generate for NCAA
member institutions, not a penny finds its way into the pocket of the
student-athlete. This is due to the principles and ideals upon which the
NCAA was founded.20 Although times have certainly changed, the NCAA
still adheres to these principles as its reason for prohibiting monetary
compensation for student-athletes.
A. NCAA Rules on Amateurism
NCAA rules on amateurism seek to create a clear line between
college athletics and professional sports. In order to participate in
college sports, an athlete must conform to general regulations regarding
amateur status delineated in section 12.1.1. Subsection (a) states that an
athlete's amateur status is revoked if the athlete uses his or her athletic
skill to receive payment in any form for their performance in that sport.
23
Section 12.02.3 specifies that a professional athlete is one who receives
17. See Finney, supra note 14, at DI.
18. Kenneth L. Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of Sport: Amatuerism and
Compensation, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7, 26-27 (1991). For example, Nike pays John
Thompson, Georgetown University men's basketball head coach, $100,000 a year. Id. at 27.
Adidas pays Duke University's Mike Krzyzewski $260,000 a year for exclusive shoe contracts
for Duke's men's basketball team. Id. Additionally, Penn State University is under a contract
with Nike that pays the school $5 million per year to place the Nike "swoosh" on the uniforms
of the Penn State football team. Finney, supra note 14, at DI.
19. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15, § 15.02.2.1.
20. Id. art. 2, § 2.9.
21. Id. art. 12, § 12.01.2.
22. Id. § 12.1.1.
23. Id.
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any unauthorized payment, directly or indirectly, for athletics
participation.24
1. Amateur/Education Model
Serious questions arise about the effectiveness and practicality of
current NCAA rules on eligibility. The NCAA's rules on collegiate
athletic competition are based primarily on a system commonly known as
the "amateur/education" model.25 The model relies on an out-dated notion
of amateurism inconsistent with the present environment of collegiate
sports.
26
Under this model, collegiate athletics are considered an integral part
of the educational process at the university. 27  The student-athlete is
thought to embody the altruistic values of selflessness, devotion, sacrifice,
and purity.28 .Furthermore, the student-athlete is believed to participate in• • 29
sports for pleasure and physical, mental, or social benefits. The athletic
scholarship is the preferred form of compensation because it allows the
student-athlete to participate in sports for pure pleasure while allowing the
individual to define and develop useful skills while enrolled in an
academic program. However, these traditional notions of amateurism are
neither accommodating nor reconcilable with the commercialism present
in college athletics.
The amateur/education model does not acknowledge the modem
interests driving college sports, namely financial gain and institutional
prestige. 31 Forcing a student-athlete to uphold the ideals expressed in the
amateur/education model, while allowing universities to reap the profits
from the athletes' participation, allows for the exploitation of these
student-athletes. 32 The model fails to address the unique features of therelationship between the university and the student-athlete. 33  Some
24. See id. § 12.02.3. "Unauthorized" forms of payment include any salary, gratuity, or
other forms of comparable compensation. Id. § 12.1.1.1.
25. See Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting
Realities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269, 273 (1994).
26. See id. at 273-80.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 273.
29. See Schott, supra note 1, at 31.
30. See id. at 26.
31. See Davis, supra note 25, at 278.
32. Universities exploit college athletes by holding them to the notions of amateurism,
including those embodied in the NCAA rules, yet denying many of them the education they
were promised. See Schott, supra note 1, at 26 n.5.
33. Id. at 26.
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contend that athletes in revenue-producing sports are the only scholarship
students within the university who have a condition for receiving their
scholarship.34  This condition is that their athletic performances will
generate substantial revenue and exposure for their institutions.35  By
preventing student-athletes from receiving a portion of the revenues they
generate, schools exploit their talents.
36
2. Commercial/Education Model
In response to the problems associated with the amateur/education
model, a model based on the modem-day economic realities of college
sports was introduced.37 The "commercial/education" model holds that
college sports are a commercial enterprise subject to the same economic
considerations as other industries.
38
Under this model, economics displace traditional principles of
amateurism as the controlling force of sports. 39 The commercial/education
model recognizes that college athletics is a commodity that is marketed,
advertised, and sold like any other product. 40 By establishing the
importance of commercialism and discarding the traditional ideals of
amateurism, this model is more sympathetic to the possibilities of
rewarding college athletes with monetary compensation.
By recognizing that the student-athlete is an integral part of the
college sports commodity, the model favors paying student-athletes for
their contribution to the viability of the product.4 1 In addition, by realizing
that commercial aspects do indeed have a heightened effect over collegiate
sports, the model accepts the fact that college sports exist in a completely
34. See Ellen J. Staurowsky, Another Perspective on Compensation: Traditionalists Use a
Semantic Dodge on Paying Athletes, NCAA NEWS, June 28, 1995, at 4; see also Schott, supra
note 1, at 34. College students in other university departments are not faced with the same
restrictions as college athletes, even if they are on scholarship for academic or other abilities.
Id. These students are allowed to work during the school year, and an outside entity can pay for
that student's compensation. Id. However, current NCAA eligibility rules prevent student-
athletes from partaking in these benefits. Id.
35. Id.
36. In essence, universities condition student-athletes' scholarships, and thus, education on
the success of the athletic team, without providing the necessary rewards for the student-
athletes' academic and athletic achievements.
37. Davis, supra note 25, at 279.
38. Id.
39. Id,
40. Id at 280.
41. See id. at 279-81.
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different environment today than that faced by the founders of the NCAA
nearly 100 years ago.4
2
B. Existing Rules on Student Compensation
There are three possible sources of compensation affecting student-
athletes, two of which the NCAA places limits on and one that the NCAA
43prohibits. First, colleges and universities can offer scholarships, a source
of compensation that is entirely up to the discretion of the educational
institution.44 Additionally, the NCAA allows student-athletes to engage in
limited part-time employment.45  Finally, the NCAA prohibits student-
athletes from receiving money from third parties, including agents,
"boosters," and potential endorsers. 46 Each of these sources are regulated
by the NCAA in a manner tending to limit the ability of these individuals
to pursue economic opportunities.
1. Scholarships
Universities argue that athletic scholarships are adequate
compensation. 47 This argument, however, does not reflect the current state
of affairs. A four-year scholarship is generally worth between about
$30,000 (state university) to $120,000 (private university).48  In
42. Id.
43. See Schott, supra note 1, at 27.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 28.
46. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 12.1, 12.3.1, 12.1.1.1.4.1.
47. See Schott, supra note 1, at 26. Universities argue that athletic scholarships allow
student-athletes to participate in college athletics for four or five years while receiving a quality
education. Id. With this education, student-athletes can pursue their career goals, regardless if
these goals include professional sports. Id. Consequently, the NCAA and its member schools
infer that the college education provided through athletic scholarships is adequate compensation
for athletic participation. Id.
48. At the University of Washington, for example, an athletic scholarship covering tuition,
fees, room, and board would be worth roughly $8800 per year in to resident students and
roughly $14,000 for non-resident students. US. News Online, University of Washington: At a
Glance (visited Apr. 23, 1998) <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/ugrad97/drglance_
3798.htm> (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal). If a student-
athlete participates for all four years, the value of his or her scholarship at the University of
Washington is roughly $35,200 for state residents, or $56,000 for non-state residents ($50,800 if
the student is allowed to claim state residency after one year of matriculation). Tuition at other
universities with high profile sports programs varies. A four-year scholarship in 1997-98 at the
University of California at Los Angeles ("UCLA"), for example, was worth $40,752 for state
residents, or $74,328 for non-resident students. U.S. News Online, University of California, Los
Angeles: At a Glance (visited Apr. 23, 1998) <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/ugrad97/
drglance_1315.htrn> (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal). A
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comparison, popular and talented student-athletes may be able to generate
millions of dollars for their university throughout their collegiate career.49
When current NCAA rules were created nearly 100 years ago,50 this
economic disparity between the value of a scholarship and the amount of
money generated by student-athletes did not exist.51 Continued reliance on
scholarships fails to recognize the stark economic gaps inherent in present-
day collegiate athletics.
Some view athletic scholarships as a means of giving a student-
athlete an opportunity to receive a quality education while participating in
college athletics. 52 The scholarship and opportunity to receive a college
education is seen as adequate compensation for the student-athlete's on-
field performance. The extent to which colleges and universities have
promoted this ideal, however, has been heavily scrutinized. An alarming
number of student-athletes fail to graduate,5 leading some to question
whether they actually received adequate compensation for their athletic
services. 54  The disparity between the number of student-athletes offered
scholarships and the number that actually graduate have led some to
question whether colleges and universities are focusing more on the
commercial value of potential recruits than on their educational well-
four-year scholarship in 1997-98 at Florida State University was worth $30,704 for state
residents, or $51,672 for non-resident students. US. News Online, Florida State University: At
a Glance (visited Apr. 23, 1998) <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/ugrad97/
drglance_1489.htm> (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
In contrast to these two state-funded universities, a four-year scholarship to a private
university would be much more valuable. A four-year scholarship in 1997-98 at Duke
University, for example, would have been worth $116,036 for both residents and non-residents.
U.S. News Online, Duke University: At a Glance (visited Apr. 23, 1998) <http://
www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/ugrad97/drglance-2920.htm> (on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
49. For example, the Los Angeles Daily News estimated that former UCLA basketball
player Ed O'Bannon was worth $420,000 to UCLA during the 1993-94 season. Mark Alesia,
Pay for Play?, L.A. DAILY NEwS, Nov. 13, 1994, at S1. In addition, basketball star Patrick
Ewing's four-year career at Georgetown University was estimated to have produced over $12
million for the school. See Robert N. Davis, Academics and Athletics on a Collision Course, 66
N.D. L. REv. 239, 255-56 (1990).
50. The NCAA was initially formed in 1905 by 62 schools known as the Intercollegiate
Athletic Association of the United States ("IAAUS"). Chin, supra note 4, at 1215. The IAAUS
formally changed its name to the NCAA in 1910. Schott, supra note 1, at 30.
51. See Goldman, supra note 4, at 209 (arguing that the focus of college athletics was not
how much revenue each sport could raise for the university, but rather the focus was on making
the playing conditions as safe as possible for the participants).
52. Schott, supra note 1, at 26.
53. Id. at 28.
54. See Eric J. Sobocinski, College Athletics: What is Fair Compensation?, 7 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 257, 286-88 (1996).
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being.5 Thus, colleges and universities may be failing to provide the
educational benefits they guarantee each student-athlete in their
scholarship agreements.
56
Additional support for this argument is found in NCAA rules that
allow member schools to revoke scholarship agreements. 57 New NCAA
rules specify that athletes who enter professional drafts, and are drafted,
are ineligible for any future participation in collegiate sports.5 8 Therefore,
if underclassmen decide to enter the draft, but instead choose to return to
college to complete their education, NCAA regulations deny them that
choice. 59  Without eligibility, most universities are reluctant to Jgive
student-athletes even a partial scholarship to further their education. In
essence, these universities are denying student-athletes wishing to test the
professional market the very educational opportunity they claim to
promote through scholarships.
2. Part-Time Jobs
In January 1996, due to overwhelming support for student-athletes to
receive compensation, the NCAA passed a measure allowing student-
athletes to obtain part-time jobs during the school year.6 1 The part-time
jobs allow student-athletes to make up the difference between the value of
an athletic scholarship and the school's "full cost of attendance." 62 At the
University of Washington, for example, a scholarship covers the $8800 to
$14,000 needed to attend the university, but does not take into account
the student-athlete's personal or travel costs, which are approximately
55. See Schott, supra note 1, at 26. Two-thirds of all professional football and basketball
players never received a college degree. Id. at 28. Statistics also show that a significant number
of football players at Division I universities are placed on academic probation at some point in
their academic careers. Id. at 26 n.6.
56. See id. at 26-27.
57. See NCAA Hardens NBA Decision, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.) Jan. 15, 1997, at
D6.
58. Id. An exception was recently added that would allow undrafted basketball players to
return to college. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12, § 12.2.4.2.1. However, this rule does
not apply to any other sports in which underclassmen choose to enter a professional draft and go
undrafted. Id.
59. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12, § 12.1.1 (a).
60. Id. art. 14, § 14.01.1.
61. Sharon Robb, NCAA Allowing Athletes' Jobs Gets Mixed Review in S. Florida, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 15, 1997, at 8C; see also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15,
§ 15.2.6.
62. See Don Borst, Colleges: NCAA Likely to Let Athletes Get Jobs, MORNING NEWS TRIB.
(Tacoma, Wash.), Aug. 23, 1996, at C2.
63. See discussion supra note 48.
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$2100. 64 A part-time job would allow a student-athlete to make this $2100
in order to fully satisfy his or her needs. 65  However, this proposed
employment system is subject to serious questions regarding the time
constraints placed on athletes, and the possibility of illegal activities
arising from these jobs.
66
The first problem is that student-athletes usually do not have time for
a part-time job.67  They are already burdened with full-time class
schedules, homework, practice, and travel for road games.68 Therefore, a
twenty hour-per-week job stretches an already full-time schedule even• 69 ..
thinner. By accepting a part-time job, athletes are compelled to sacrifice
study time for work hours. The student-athlete would be better served
spending their time studying to achieve a college degree, rather than
working at a part-time job.7°
Also, allowing part-time jobs may lead to illegal activities as wealthy
boosters seek to supplement a student-athlete's paltry salary with hefty
"tips.9'7 1 A booster, for example, could slip a student-athlete working as a
waiter a $100 tip that, if unreported by the student-athlete, would not be
part of his salary.72 By allowing student-athletes to get jobs, the NCAA
has essentially made it easier for boosters to slip favored athletes extra
money "under the table." 73
3. Compensation from "Outside Sources"
The NCAA limits compensation to scholarships and part-time jobs by
prohibiting student-athletes from receiving compensation from other
supporters unaffiliated with the university. 74  For example, a student-
athlete may not receive any money from an advertiser who uses his or her
64. Borst, supra note 62, at C2.
65. Id.
66. See Cameron Maun, Sports Day: Part-Time Jobs Will Change Focus of College
Athletics, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 25, 1997, at B1.
67. Attending school is a full-time job; participating in athletics is the equivalent of two
full-time jobs (one as a student, and one as an athlete). Id. Thus, allowing part-time jobs to
provide some monetary compensation to student-athletes would overtax them. Id.
68. Robb, supra note 61, at 8C.
69. Id.
70. Id. As one commentator observed, "Could we reasonably expect a student-athlete
working a part-time job to maintain quality grades and still enjoy their newfound compensation
for what free time they have left?" Maun, supra note 66, at B7.
71. Maum, supra note 66, at B7.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12, § 12.1.
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name or image in a commercial advertisement. 75 In addition, a student-
athlete's athletic eligibility is revoked once they sign with an agent for the
purpose of commercially marketing their athletic ability.76  Finally, the
student-athlete is prevented from receiving cash from persons unaffiliated
with the NCAA as an award for their athletic performance."
The NCAA justifies these restrictions as being necessary to preserve
the principles of amateurism and to protect student-athletes from
commercial exploitation.78  However, NCAA rules restrictinA
compensation injure free competition in collegiate athletics.
Consequently, NCAA regulations may violate antitrust laws imposed by
the Sherman Antitrust Act.
80
Thus, the present system based on the amateur/education model is not
viable in the current collegiate athletic environment. The NCAA can no
longer rely on the value of a college education as representing adequate
compensation. The commercialism in college athletics today acts as a
deterrent against student-athletes completing their college education.
81
The mere possibility of receiving a college degree creates an unequal
exchange when compared with the millions of dollars of revenue that these
athletes generate.82  In addition, allowing part-time jobs for student-
athletes raises concerns about over-taxing a student-athlete's already
fragmented time schedule and increasing the opportunity for boosters to
make "illegal" payments to favored athletes.8 3 Also, by enforcing its rules
75. Id. art. 12, § 12.5.2.1.
76. Id. art. 12, § 12.3.1.
77. Id. art. 12, § 12.1.1.1.4.1.
78. Id. art. 2, § 2.9.
79. See Chin, supra note 4, at 1232. Current regulations prevent student-athletes from
selling their athletic skills to the highest bidder. Id. In imposing the current rules, the NCAA
has effectively destroyed competition for student-athlete services. Id. Instead of actively
bidding with one another for the services of student-athletes, universities merely offer
comparable compensation in the form of athletic scholarships, which prevent student-athletes
from earning the highest price for his or her labor. Id.
80. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1998).
81. The commercialism in present-day college sports leads universities to engage in
bidding wars at the expense of their athletes. Schools attempt to market their "star players" to
the networks, which provide exposure and profit for these schools. Because the student-athletes
being marketed currently receive no portion of this profit, the professional leagues offer more
financial opportunities, regardless of whether these student-athletes have completed their
academic requirements. See Rookie Johnson, Sometimes it Simply Boils Down to Matter of
Dollars and Sense, STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.) May 9, 1996, at 4.
82. See Davis, supra note 49, at 256 (discussing the unequal balance between the revenue
generated by Georgetown University during the four years Patrick Ewing attended the school
and the value of the athletic scholarship he received).
83. See Maun, supra note 66, at B7.
1998]
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limiting compensation, the NCAA may be subjecting itself to antitrust
scrutiny under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
84
The only cure to this system is to implement rules and regulations
conforming to the special circumstances of the situation. The
commercial/education model recognizes the intricacies of today's system
and should serve as a foundation for this new system. Using this model as
a base, a strong argument can be made for the implementing a system of
revenue sharing in which student-athletes would receive a portion of the
revenues they generate as a means of compensation.
IV. NCAA REGULATIONS AND THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT-
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF COLLEGIATE SPORTS
Current NCAA alternatives for compensation, such as scholarships
and part-time jobs, are not viable in the present commercial environment
of collegiate athletics. In addition, NCAA regulations prevent
implementing a new system that would allow student-athletes to receive a
more comparable amount of compensation. However, NCAA regulations
may not conform to the antitrust standards set by the Sherman Antitrust
Act. If these rules violate the Sherman Antitrust Act and are consequently
invalidated, there would be an opportunity to develop compensation
packages that fully compensate student-athletes. An example of this
would be a revenue-sharing program.
Passed in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act's main purposes are: (1)
to protect commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies; and (2) to
preserve freedom of competition. 85 There are generally two elements to
analyzing a Sherman Antitrust Act claim.86 First, it must be determined
whether the Act applies to the challenged activity.87  A threshold
requirement for challenging a business practice is that the activity involve
interstate commerce, making the action reachable by Congress under its
commerce powers. 8 If the Act applies, the second inquiry involves
whether the business practice challenged actually violates the Act.8
9
84. See discussion infra Part IV.
85. HARRY AUBREY TOuLMIN JR., A TREATISE ON THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES § 4.4 (1949); see also 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
101 (Rev. ed. 1997).
86. See Goldman, supra note 4, at 214, 219-24.
87. See TOULMIN, supra note 85, § 4.5.
88. Id. A cursory reading of the Sherman Antitrust Act reveals that it was the intent of
Congress to forbid any restraint on interstate or foreign commerce. Id.
89. See Chin, supra note 4, at 1230-32; see also Goldman, supra note 4, at 219-44. If the
Act applies to the challenged restraint, the court will apply one of three analyses to determine
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It is generally recognized, however, that the Act cannot be construed
literally, inasmuch as every agreement restrains trade to some 
extent.90
Therefore, antitrust claims against a business combination or contract turn
on whether the combination or contract "unreasonably" restrains trade.
91
Three tests are used by courts to determine if a combination or contract
violates the Act: (1) the "per se" test- (2) the "rule of reason" test; and (3)
the "quick look rule of reason" test. Accordingly, this Part analyzes the
NCAA rules preventing college athletes from receiving compensation first
to determine if the Act applies, and second to determine whether these
rules violate the Act.
93
A. The NCAA and Interstate Commerce
In the context of antitrust claims, the interstate commerce
requirement includes any activity within "the flow of interstate commerce"
or "affecting commerce."94  There is some dispute among lower courts
about whether a plaintiff must establish a nexus between the restraint and
interstate commerce, or simply an effect on commerce resulting from the
defendant's business activities in general. 95  However, reconciling this
dispute is unnecessary because NCAA restraints on student compensation
satisfy both tests.96
It is apparent from the various elements of collegiate athletics that
creating and conducting a collegiate sports program involves interstate
activities. 97 In addition, courts have generally held that NCAA restraints
on college sports involve and affect interstate commerce. 98  In Justice v.
whether the restraint violates the Sherman Antitrust Act. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1-3.
90. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 64-65 (1911); see also Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
91. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984).
92. See Jay P. Yancey, Is the Quick Look Too Quick?: Potential Problems With the Quick
Look Analysis of Antitrust Litigation, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 671, 674-81 (1996).
93. Specifically, Part IV of this Comment focuses on NCAA Rule 15.2, discussing how it
limits the amount of financial aid a student may receive for tuition and fees, room and board,
and course-related books. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15, § 15.2. This restriction
implicitly restricts NCAA athletes from receiving any other form of compensation for their
performances on the field. See id. art. 12, §§ 12.1.1.4.1, 12.1.1.1.5, 12.1.1.1.6.
94. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 85, 266.
95. See Goldman, supra note 4, at 215.
96. Id.
97. Current collegiate athletic programs include student-athletes who are recruited
nationwide, the different schools compete nationally, and games are televised throughout the
country. Id.
98. See, e.g., NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d
1150 (5th Cir. 1977).
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NCAA, 99 the District Court recognized that the NCAA's regulatory activity
was sufficient to establish the requisite interstate involvement. 00  In
reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged that the NCAA
schedules games that call for the transportation of teams across state lines,
and also regulates nationwide recruiting of high school 
athletes.10'
1. "Commerce" v. "Interstate Commerce"
In United States v. Lopez, 10 2 the Supreme Court limited federal power
under the Commerce Clause by rejecting a federal statute that forbade the
possession of a gun in a school zone. !°3  The Court held that mere
possession of a weapon in a school zone was not "commerce" because it
had nothing to do with manufacturing or trade.' 04 Based on the holding in
Lopez, the NCAA has argued that it is not involved in "commerce" in
general, and therefore, its rules should not be subject to the scrutiny of the
Sherman Antitrust Act105
In Smith v. NCAA, 106 a student-athlete claimed that NCAA
regulations prohibiting graduate students from using their remaining
eligibility at a different school from the one at which they played as an
undergraduate were unreasonable restraints of trade and injurious to their
business and property.'0 7 The District Court held that the NCAA rules in
question did not involve commerce, thus making the Sherman Antitrust
Act inapplicable. The court, citing a similar holding in Justice, held thatthe Sherman Antitrust Act is only applicable to NCAA activities that are
99. 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
100. Id. at 378.
101. Id.
102. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
103. Id. at 551-52.
104. Id. at 561. More importantly, the Court was concerned with the fact that the statutory
language contained no "jurisdictional element" limiting its application to those instances of gun
possession that affect interstate commerce. Id. at 561-62. Furthermore, the legislative history
of the statute contained no factual findings establishing a nexus between gun possession and
interstate commerce. Id. at 562-63.
105. Goldman, supra note 4, at 215.
106. 978 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
107. Id. at 215-16. Eligibility was denied pursuant to NCAA Bylaw 14.1.8.2, which
prohibited student-athletes from participating in intercollegiate athletics at a postgraduate
institution other than the one from which they received their undergraduate degree. Id. Because
the student-athlete completed her undergraduate studies at St. Bonaventure University and was
participating in a postbaccalaureate program at the University of Pittsburgh, she was deemed to
be ineligible. Id.
108. Id. at 217-18.
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related to its commerce or business. 109 The court determined that there
was no logical way to conclude that rules regarding student-athlete
eligibility involved a commercial activity, or afforded any of its member
institutions with a commercial advantage." 0  Therefore, the court
implicitly held that NCAA eligibility rules were not subject to the antitrust
laws under the Sherman Antitrust Act." 
1I
2. Errors in Smith
The court's holding in Smith, however, is subject to criticism for
three reasons. First, the reliance on Lopez is misplaced. Lopez cannot be
applied to the Sherman Antitrust Act because antitrust laws properly limit
their coverage to business combinations affecting interstate commerce.11
2
One of the main reasons the Court struck down the restriction in Lopez was
because the statute did not limit its application to activities affecting
interstate commerce.11 3 However, antitrust laws limit their coverage to
only those activities defined as "commerce.""14 Accordingly, application
of the commerce provision in antitrust laws should be regarded as an
exercise in statutory interpretation, not constitutional law. The impact
of a holding that a given activity is not "in" commerce is not to declare the
antitrust statute unconstitutional, but merely to hold that as a matter of
statutory interpretation, the statute does not reach the activity in
question.
Second, applying Smith to NCAA eligibility rules contradicts existing
precedent. The holding is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision
in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 117 where the Court implicitly accepted the
fact that NCAA regulations involved commerce. The Court held that
NCAA regulations on television contracts violated antitrust laws,
implicitly recognizing that the antitrust challenge involved interstate
commerce.
109. Id. at 217 (citing Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983)).
110. Id. at 218.
111. See id.
112. The Sherman Antitrust Act limits antitrust violations to contracts, combinations in the
form of trusts, and conspiracies in restraint of interstate commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1993).
113. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
114. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 85, 266.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
118. See id. at 119-20.
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Therefore, any case dismissing an antitrust claim on the grounds that
the NCAA is not engaged in interstate commerce, as the District Court
found in Smith, is inconsistent with Board of Regents. In fact, in Justice,
the District Court found that an NCAA sanction prohibiting a team from
participating in post-season competition involved interstate commerce.t19
Indeed, because the NCAA operates in all fifty states, whether it is
regulating teleyision contracts, student eligibility, team play, or
compensation for student-athletes, it is engaging in interstate commerce.
Third, the holding in Smith fails to acknowledge the
commercialization of college sports today. The majority in Smith seemed
to view college sports through the traditional amateur/education model,
120
where notions of commercialism are dwarfed by idealistic visions of
athletes participating in sports for the mere joy of playing.121 Relying on
the amateur/education model, NCAA rules regarding eligibility would
appear to not involve commerce.1 22 However, reliance on this model casts
a blind eye towards the effects of commercialism on present-day collegiate
athletics.123 Modem-day college athletics, especially men's basketball and
football, is a vast commercial venture that yields substantial profits for
colleges. 24  Consequently, college athletics is a commodity that is sold
like any other product to produce revenue.
25
Accordingly, the majority opinion in Smith, which held that
eligibility rules regarding college sports were not in any way connected
with commercial activity, is difficult to accept. Eligibility rules restrict
athletes, the very people who produce the entertainment that colleges and
universities commercially market as college sports. Hence, eligibility
119. Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 378 (D. Ariz. 1983).
120. See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
121. See Davis, supra note 25, at 274.
122. In the amateur/education model, students do not participate in athletics to get paid.
Therefore, it would be irrelevant how much revenue these student-athletes generate. The
eligibility rules in this instance would be to distinguish rules regarding which student-athletes
can play in sports (i.e., only those who have been in college less than four years), instead of as a
means of enforcement against student-athletes gaining compensation.
123. See Mike McGraw et al., Money Games Inside the NCAA: Revenues Dominate
College Sports World, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 5, 1997, at Al. Current collegiate athletics is big
business. Universities profit from the on-field performance of their student-athletes and are
constantly seeking to maximize their revenues. Id. Colleges increase revenues by expanding
stadiums to seat more people. Id. The University of Texas recently planned to expand its
football stadium to 82,000 seats. Id. In addition, 66 new luxury suites were added, which will
boost revenue by $3 million per year. Id.
124. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1099 (7th Cir. 1992) (Flaum, J., dissenting); see also
Goldman, supra note 4, at 216. In presenting amateur athletics to the ticket-paying, television-
buying public, the NCAA is engaged in a large commercial venture. Id.
125. Davis, supra note 25, at 280.
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rules are directly related to commerce because their restrictions determine
which athletes participate in this commercial activity.
B. Application of Antitrust Law to Section 1 Sherman Antitrust Act
Claims-Three Types of Analyses
Assuming that the Sherman Antitrust Act applies to NCAA
regulations, the next inquiry focuses on whether NCAA rules violate the
Act. NCAA limits on student-compensation generally restrain free
competition between NCAA member schools. Instead of actively
competing for student-athletes, colleges and universities are compelled to
limit their compensation packages to the standards set by NCAA
regulations.
However, courts have specified that only "unreasonable" restraints of
competition or commerce violate section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. 126  In order to determine whether a restraint is "unreasonable," the
courts have developed what some commentators see as a "continuum-
based" approach.' Under this approach, the level of scrutiny applied to
each restriction of competition is dependent on where each restriction fits128
along the antitrust continuum. The success of a student-athlete's
potential claim against the NCAA can be measured by inserting NCAA
eligibility rules into this continuum.
1. Per Se Antitrust Analysis
a. History and Elements of the Rule
At one end of the continuum lies the per se approach. This approach
is used for restrictions that would "almost always" be found illegal, even
under more discretionary analysis. 129 All antitrust claims subjected to per
126. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984).
127. See Thomas A. Piraino Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to
Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 685, 710 (1991).
128. Id. at 711. More specifically, the classification of restrictions along this continuum
would be based on the clarity of the restriction's impact on competition. Id. The clearer the
anti-competitive effects of the conduct, the closer it would be to the per se end of the continuum.
Id. However, where the purpose and effect of the restriction is more ambiguous, the conduct
would lie in the rule of reason portion of the continuum. Id.
129. Id.; see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)
(holding that per se treatment is appropriate "[olnce experience with a particular kind of
restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it..
."); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (holding that some types of
restraints have such predictable and pernicious anti-competitive effect, and such limited
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se analysis will be found to be "unreasonable" and a violation of antitrust
laws. 13  Under the per se rule, the plaintiff does not have to prove that the
restriction led to a decrease in competition. 13 1 In addition, the court will
not consider any of the defendant's proffered justifications for the
restraint. 132  In essence, the court will determine that the restriction
violates antitrust laws and nothing the defendant argues can save the
restraint from its demise. For example, in United States v. Socony- Vacuum
Oil Co., 133 the Supreme Court noted that a combination that tampers with
price structure or is formed for the purpose of fixing prices is illegal per
se. 134  Consequently, horizontal price fixing has been traditionally
considered to be a classic example of an illegal per se restraint.
135
b. Application to Regulations on Compensation
Upon initial examination, all NCAA restrictions on compensation to
student-athletes, including Rule 15.2, seem to be illegal per se. The
NCAA is an association of schools that compete against each other to
136giseahohrtattract student-athletes for their athletic programs.' NCAA restrictions,
like Rule 15.2, seek to eliminate all forms of price competition among
member schools by limiting the "price" paid to student-athletes.
Therefore, under the reasoning in Socony-Vacuum, NCAA restrictions on
student-athlete compensation constitute horizontal price fixing and should
be per se illegal.
In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court had the option to use the per
se test. The NCAA rule in question placed a ceiling on the number of
games member schools could televise. The Supreme Court recognized
potential for pro-competitive benefit, that they are deemed per se unlawful).
130. See Yancey, supra note 92, at 676-77. If the necessary effect of the restraint restricts
competition in general, then the court can condemn the restraint without any further inquiry
because allowing such a restraint would contradict the general principles of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Id.
131. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5; see also Yancey, supra note 92, at 677.
132. Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1357 (N.D. Ill.
1991); see also Don Shacknai, Sports Broadcasting and the Antitrust Laws: Stay Tuned for
Baseball After the Bulls Romp in Court, 1 SPORTS LAWs. J. 1, 35 (1994).
133. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
134. Id. at 221, 223.
135. See Yancey, supra note 92, at 677. A horizontal restraint is an agreement among
business competitors on the way in which they compete with one another. Board of Regents,
468 U.S. at 99. A horizontal price fixing restraint then is an agreement by competitors to fix the
price they will pay for a product in order to keep costs down. Id.
136. Goldman, supra note 4, at 220.
137. Id.
138. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 95.
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that by participating in an association that prevented competition for
television rights, the NCAA and its member schools had created a
horizontal restraint. 139  However, while acknowledging that horizontal
price fixing is ordinarily deemed as illegal per se, the Court felt that it was
inappropriate to apply the per se rule to the restriction. 4 ° The Court
refused to apply per se reasoning because it considered horizontal
restraints on competition essential to produce college 
athletics. 141
Therefore, despite the fact that the regulations restrained the activity of
member schools, the Court believed it had to consider the NCAA's
justifications for these restraints.
142
After the Supreme Court's ruling in Board of Regents, courts have
been wary of applying the per se rule to NCAA regulations. lb In fact, no
court has yet to apply the per se rule to invalidate an NCAA rule or
regulation. Therefore, it would not be viable for a student-athlete to rely
on the per se analysis for their antitrust claims.
2. Traditional Rule of Reason Analysis
a. Elements
Whereas the per se rule represents the most stringent of the three
main approaches, the "traditional" rule of reason (hereinafter "rule of
reason") analysis provides the NCAA with the most leeway to present
justifications for eligibility restraints. 144 Rule of reason analysis seeks to
separate reasonable restraints that merely regulate or promote trade, from
unreasonable restraints that suppress or destroy competition. In order to
determine which restraints are reasonable, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, in United States v. Brown University,145 created a two step
139. Id. at 99.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 101. The Court focused on the fact that rules, such as those governing the size
of the field, the number of players on a team, and the extent to which physical violence is
proscribed, must be agreed upon by all member schools in order to have college sports. Id.
Consequently, while these rules restrain the manner in which institutions compete, they are not
deemed illegal per se. Id.
142. Id. at 103.
143. See, e.g., Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1151 (5th Cir. 1977); Law v. NCAA,
902 F. Supp. 1394, 1403-04 (D. Kan. 1995).
144. Under a per se analysis, a restriction can be condemned without considering any of
the defendant's proffered justifications. See Shacknai, supra note 132, at 35. However, under a
rule of reason approach, the defendant is at least allowed an opportunity to show that the
restraint has some redeeming pro-competitive effects. See Yancey, supra note 92, at 675.
145. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
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• 146
procedure. First, the plaintiff must show the restraint has anti-
competitive effects within the relevant geographic and product 
markets.147
If the plaintiff meets the burden of proving anti-competitive effects, the
burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the restraint is actually. • 148
pro-competitive. If the defendant can show that the restraint increaseseconomic competition, it will be upheld as a reasonable restraint.1 49
b. Judicial Application
In applying rule of reason analysis to NCAA regulations, courts have
generally recognized that the NCAA acts in two different markets. 150 The
first is a purely commercial market, where the purpose of the regulation is
to maximize profits. 151 Any NCAA regulations in the commercial market
have generally been subject to high antitrust scrutiny.
52
One example of judicial disdain for NCAA regulations in a
commercial market is Law v. NCAA. 153  The restriction in Law was an
NCAA rule limiting the compensation paid to different men's basketball
assistant coaches of each university. 154 The District Court held the rule to
be invalid because it was not connected to any legitimate non-commercial
146. Yancey, supra note 92, at 675.
147. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668. A plaintiff may prove anti-competitive effects by
showing actual anti-competitive consequences, such as an increase in price, or by showing that
the defendant has market power. Id. Market power is defined as the ability to affect the market
price for the relevant market. See Sherman Act Invalidation, supra note 4, at 1309.
148. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669. In order to fulfill this burden, the defendant must prove
three things. Yancey, supra note 92, at 676. First, the defendant must show that the restraint
has some pro-competitive benefits. Id. Second, the defendant must show that these pro-
competitive benefits outweigh the anti-competitive harms created by the restraint. Id. Finally,
the defendant must prove that the restraint is the least restrictive alternative to achieve these pro-
competitive benefits. Id.
149. See Sherman Act Invalidation, supra note 4, at 1307.
150. See Chin, supra note 4, at 1224; see also Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743
(M.D. Tenn. 1990).
151. See Chin, supra note 4, at 1224.
152. Id.; see also, NCAA v. Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288-89 (W.D. Okla.
1982); Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 743.
153. 902 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Kan. 1995).
154. Id. at 1400. The rule limited the men's basketball team of each school to three fully
paid head or assistant coaches and one restricted earnings coach. Id. The restricted earnings
coach was limited to receiving $12,000 during the academic year and $4,000 during the summer
months. Id. Therefore, if a school previously had a head coach and three assistant coaches,
under this rule one of the assistant coaches would have to be designated as a restricted earnings
coach and have his salary reduced within the limits imposed by the NCAA. The NCAA
expressly stated that the purpose of the rule was to cut the costs of running athletic programs,
but argued that the restriction was non-commercial because it helped the NCAA member
schools from ruinous cost increases. Id. at 1406.
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goal.'15 Because the NCAA expressly stated that the purpose of the rule
was to cut costs, and thereby maximize profits, the court recognized that
the restriction directly regulated a commercial market and was therefore
illegal.1
56
Conversely, courts have been lenient in applying the rule of reason
scrutiny to NCAA regulations in the non-commercial educational
market.'5 7 Regulation in this market is directed at preserving amateurism. . .. .. 158
and maintaining the identity of college athletics. Therefore, these
restrictions will usually be upheld regardless of their regulatory effects.
159
Despite this judicial deference, a student-athlete may convince a
court that Rule 15.2 is invalid by showing that it is not connected to the
legitimate goals of the NCAA. Such a challenge would seek to establish
that the NCAA has abandoned the goal of combining education with
athletics, and thus no longer has the right to intervene and restrain
competition among colleges. 16  Without a connection to legitimate goals,
the NCAA's entire regulatory program fits a pattern of purely anti-
competitive behavior, and should be invalidated as a violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. 161 Additionally, if a student-athlete can prove that
the NCAA's rules are aimed at maximizing profits, and not at upholding
traditional goals, an argument can be made that these restrictions should be
treated and rejected as regulations within a purely commercial market.
155. Id. at 1409.
156. Id.
157. Chin, supra note 4, at 1224; see also Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1154; Justice, 577 F.
Supp. at 382-83.
158. Chin, supra note 4, at 1224; see also Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 743.
159. Chin, supra note 4, at 1225; see also Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1154; Justice, 577 F.
Supp. at 382-83.
160. Peter C. Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-Athletes, and the NCAA:
Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private Economic Regulations, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 545, 584.
161. Id. In fact, the Supreme Court in the past has invalidated supposedly reasonable
restraints because these restraints were not related to legitimate goals. In Radiant Burners v.
Peoples Gas, Light & Coke, 364 U.S. 656 (1966), the plaintiff alleged that the Association's
program to test gas furnaces was a sham and served only to suppress competition. Id. The
Supreme Court found the restriction unlawful regardless of the net effects on the marketplace.
Id. Consequently, if a student-athlete can show that the NCAA restrictions on compensation are
not connected to legitimate goals, and are instead used only to suppress competition, then these
restrictions must be held unlawful regardless of the effects on the market.
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c. The Student-Athlete's Cause of Action
i. Defining Anti-Competitive Effects in a Relevant Market
In arguing that NCAA regulations violate section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, a student-athlete must first show that these restraints have an
anti-competitive effect on the relevant geographic and product market.
162
Instead, due to the difficulty in showing actual anti-competitive effects,
courts have required plaintiffs to show that the defendant has market
power.
163
Courts have historically defined the NCAA's market power as its
ability to affect the price its members pay for the services of student-
athletes. 164  Because the NCAA and its member institutions have
unmitigated control over the market for college players, they can directly
affect the price its members pay for student-athletes' services. 165 The
NCAA has almost complete monopsony power 166 over the student-athlete
labor market for the revenue-producing sports of men's basketball and
football. 161 If student-athletes want to participate in either sport, they must
abide by NCAA regulations, as there are no alternative leagues in which a
student-athlete can participate.
168
In addition, NCAA rules affect the price professional teams pay for
student-athletes. 16  If student-athletes forego their eligibility by entering aprofessional league as an underclassmen, they must either accept the
162. Yancey, supra note 92, at 675. A student-athlete could prove an anti-competitive
effect by showing actual injury to competition or by showing that the defendant has market
power. Id. Proving that the NCAA has market power in the relevant geographical market is
fairly simple. Schools recruit nationally and student-athletes attend universities around the
nation. Therefore, a national market is appropriate. In addition, if the NCAA argues for a
narrower market, it still has market power because the NCAA is the dominant force in college
athletics in every local region in the country. See Goldman, supra note 4, at 229.
163. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. A monopoly is created when all of the products in a certain industry are brought under
the control of one entity, making it the sole seller and controller of commodity prices and
allowing it to suppress competition. See People v. Detroit Asphalt Paving, 221 N.W. 122, 123
(Mich. 1928). A monopsony, on the other hand, occurs when there is a single buyer or group of
buyers making a joint decision. See United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 665 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1990). The NCAA exerts monopsony power because there are no alternative leagues in
which student-athletes can participate. Thus, the NCAA is the sole buyer in the market. Id.
167. Goldman, supra note 4, at 227.
168. See Sherman Act Invalidation, supra note 4, at 1309.
169. Id.
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professional team's offer or not play at all. 170 Therefore, a student-athlete
has less bargaining leverage than an athlete who could threaten to return to
college athletics if an adequate offer was not received.' 7 ' The NCAA's
unmitigated control over college athletics proves not only that the NCAA
has market power, but also has restraints on compensation that have anti-
competitive effects.
ii. The NCAA's Proposed Pro-Competitive Benefits
Once the anti-competitive effects of NCAA eligibility restrictions are
proven, the burden shifts to the NCAA to show that pro-competitive
benefits outweigh these negative effects. 172 The NCAA can validate its
restrictions by showinT that these rules are reasonably necessary to further
a legitimate purpose.
In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court stated that the
NCAA needs ample latitude to preserve education and amateurism in
collegiate athletics. 174  Therefore, the Court implied that NCAA
restrictions that promote education and amateurism are reasonable
regardless of their anti-competitive effects.' 75  Consequently, a valid
challenge to restrictions on compensation revolve around the argument
that because these rules promote neither education nor amateurism, the
anti-competitive effects outweigh the pro-competitive benefits.
(a) The Fallacy of Education in Collegiate Athletics
Historically, the NCAA has tried to create a connection between
collegiate sports and education. 17 6  Limits on compensation are said to
encourage student-athletes to choose a college based in part on educational
quality, not economic reward.177 However, an argument can be made that
some NCAA member schools have failed to fulfill their duty to educate.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Yancey, supra note 92, at 675. Taking the model set forth by the court in Brown
University, after the student-athlete (the plaintiff) has satisfied his or her burden, then the NCAA
(the defendant) must demonstrate that the restraint is actually pro-competitive. Id. In order to
satisfy this burden, the NCAA must show that the pro-competitive benefits of restrictions on
compensation outweigh the anti-competitive effects it produces. Id. In addition, the NCAA
must show that the restraints are the least restrictive means to achieve the desired results. Id.
173. Goldman, supra note 4, at 225.
174. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
175. Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 160, at 549.
176. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 2, § 2.9.
177. Goldman, supra note 4, at 240.
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Two-thirds of all professional football and basketball players never
received their college degree. 178  In addition, student-athletes are
constantly distracted from the academic aspects of college because of the
high demands placed on them by their athletic commitments. 179 Because a
college coach's job rests on the performance of his or her athletes, many
coaches place a secondary value on education. 180  Therefore, the NCAA
cannot state that restraints on student-athlete compensation help promote
educational goals. NCAA member schools often sacrifice educational
values in their efforts to create more revenue by "winning at all costs."
181
Furthermore, various rules purportedly related to preserving
education actually relate more to reducing the costs of administering
athletic programs for NCAA member schools. For example, in 1972 the
NCAA passed a rule allowing member schools to revoke the scholarship of
unproductive athletes after one year. 182  If a university was actually
concerned with the education of its student-athletes, it would guarantee
scholarships for four years regardless of an athlete's on-field
performance.
183
Essentially, the NCAA and its member schools have created an
amateur/education hypocrisy. The NCAA has claimed that its primary
goal is to create a connection between athletics and education. However,
the NCAA and its member schools have placed their own financial
interests ahead of the educational interests of their student-athletes.
(b) Preserving Amatuerism
The NCAA's second pro-competitive objective, preserving
amateurism, cannot be supported. The NCAA claims that preserving
amateurism is essential to further historic traditions and enhance the
178. Schott, supra note 1, at 26.
179. The "win at all costs" mentality inherent in college sports today threatens educational
standards. Goldman, supra note 4, at 241. Because of the millions of dollars available for
successful teams, many colleges and universities place intense pressure on their coaches to
produce winning teams and focus their student-athletes on helping the "team" first, instead of on
gaining an education. Id.
180. Schott, supra note 1, at 28. The university's "win at all costs" attitude also forces
many coaches to recruit athletes who may not be ready for a college curriculum, retain
academically troubled students, and overlook academic fraud. Goldman, supra note 4, at 241.
181. Goldman, supra note 4, at 242.
182. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15, § 15.3.5.
183. These student-athletes are replaced with more talented ones in order to produce a
better sports team, which eventually leads to more revenue.
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demand for college sports by enhancing their image. 184 However, neither
argument can be supported by compelling evidence.
The argument that the NCAA has to protect amateurism in order to
keep up with tradition is based on gross misconceptions about student-
athletes. These misconceptions are dependent on the amateur/education
model, which considers the athlete's participating in college sports as a
mere hobby. 185  However, the NCAA and its members have failed to
recognize that even under this approach, a present-day student-athlete is
not an "amateur" in its purest sense.
An amateur is someone who takes part in sports for enjoyment,
without receiving any form of compensation.186 A student-athlete, on the
other hand, does not fit this definition. In exchange for participating in
collegiate sports, the student-athlete is "compensated" in the form of
tuition and fees, room and board, and required books.' 87 At many schools,
this scholarship is valued at over $10,000.188 Therefore, it is illogical for
NCAA member schools to demand that compensation restrictions be used
to promote amateurism when their own student-athletes are not technically
amateurs. In essence, the only real reason for the compensation rules is to
allow the NCAA to eliminate all price competition among its members,
much like a classic cartel.' 89
The NCAA's focus on amateurism does not help promote college
sports.190  Most consumers are attracted to collegiate teams because of
their university affiliation. 191 Accordingly, fan interest in collegiate sports
is unlikely to be deterred simply because student-athletes received some
form of compensation. 192 It is the student-athlete's association with an
educational institution, not the wages of the players that attracts the
public's interest.
193
Perhaps more fatal is the fact that limited compensation rules do not
promote intercollegiate athletics because many NCAA institutions
frequently violate the rule. 194 Furthermore, consumer demand for college
184. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102.
185. See Davis, supra note 25, at 273.
186. Shropshire, supra note 18, at 10.
187. Goldman, supra note 4, at 206.
188. See discussion supra note 48.
189. Goldman, supra note 4, at 210.
.190. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 2659.
191. Id. For example, the University of Nebraska football team would probably generate
more interest than an unaffiliated team called the Lincoln Cornhuskers. Id.
192. Id.
193. Goldman, supra note 4, at 236.
194. Sherman Act Invalidation, supra note 4, at 1312. One of the more common violations
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sports does not decline when a university is found to violate NCAA
eligibility rules. 195  In some instances, popular demand and support for
certain schools actually increased after violating amateurism bylaws. 
196
Consequently, neither the NCAA's claim to promote education nor
its desire to preserve amateurism present a valid pro-competitive
justification for its rules regarding compensation. Because these rules are
anti-competitive and present no compelling pro-competitive objectives, the
NCAA cannot justify their implementation. Thus, these regulations must
be struck down subject to section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
197
(c) Misplaced Reliance on McCormack v. NCAA 19
8
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying the rule of
reason analysis, held in McCormack v. NCAA that the NCAA's eligibility
rules are "reasonable."' 99  Although the NCAA may wish to rely on
McCormack, a strong argument can be made that the case does not
foreclose any antitrust challenge of these rules.200 McCormack is the only
case in which a court has addressed the issue of whether NCAA
regulations on compensation violate antitrust laws, holding that they do
not.201 The court cited Board of Regents, which stated that most NCAA
regulatory controls were assumed to be reasonable. 202 However, the Court
in Board of Regents found anti-competitive restrictions reasonable only if
these restrictions furthered education and amateurism in intercollegiate
athletics.
203
is payments to student-athletes. In 1990-91, Robert Morris College was cited for making illegal
cash payments to a player. See Chin, supra note 4, at 1243. Southern Methodist University's
football team also received a one-year ban in 1987 for illegal payments to student-athletes.
Rabid boosters at the school paid student-athletes more than $60,000 during the season. In
addition, in July, 1997, the NCAA penalized the University of California after its head
basketball coach paid $30,000 to the family of a player. See Mike McGraw et al., Ruling With a
Soft Touch: NCAA Backs Away From Giving Harshest Penalties, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 7, 1997,
at Al.
195. Sherman Act Invalidation, supra note 4, at 1313 (1996).
196. Id
197. Because the pro-competitive benefits argued by the NCAA do not rescue its
regulations from the anti-competitive harms produced, a least restrictive alternative analysis is
not necessary. In essence, because there are no legitimate pro-competitive elements forwarded
by these rules, they are assumed to be overly restrictive. Yancey, supra note 92, at 675.
198. 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
199. Id. at 1343.
200. See id. ("We hold that the NCAA's eligibility rules are reasonable and that the
plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts to the contrary.") (emphasis added).
201. Schott, supra note 1, at 38.
202. Id.
203. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120 (1984).
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As evidenced by the preceding section, current NCAA restrictions on
compensation do not promote education or amateurism. Instead, they are
skewed toward limiting potential costs for NCAA member schools.
Consequently, if a court were to apply McCormack, paying special
attention to the reliance on Board of Regents, it could find NCAA
restrictions on compensation violative of the Sherman Antitrust Act under
rule of reason analysis. Therefore, instead of relying on the questionable
precedent raised in McCormack, future courts should apply their own
independent and thorough antitrust analysis in cases directly challenging
the NCAA's restraints on payments to college athletes.
2 4
3. Quick Look Rule of Reason Analysis
a. Elements and History of the Rule
The final type of analysis is an intermediate standard, borrowing
aspects from both the per se rule and traditional rule of reason. In order to
reconcile the need to regulate facially unreasonable restraints on trade,
while mitigating the harshness of the per se rule, courts have created an
intermediate scrutiny classified as quick look rule of reason.
205
Courts have developed two methods of applying the quick look rule
of reason. The first approach, used by the Third Circuit in Brown
University v. United States,20 6 treats quick look rule of reason as a burden-
shifting device.207  Under this approach, the court will presume that theplaintiff's initial burden of proving anti-competitive effects has been
204. Id. The dicta in Board of Regents seems even less compelling after considering the
true nature of NCAA regulations. The Court in Board of Regdnts granted great deference to
NCAA regulations because it felt that the regulations fostered competition and enhanced the
interest in intercollegiate athletics. Id. However, upon close examination of NCAA regulations,
the very rules that allegedly foster competition instead act as a facade for NCAA member
schools to raise profits by cutting costs. See Sherman Act Invalidation, supra note 4, at 1312.
In addition, the public interest in intercollegiate athletics is generated by on-the-field
competition and loyalties to schools, not because these schools follow NCAA regulations. Id. at
1313. The fact that fan support continues, and sometimes grows, after a school is reprimanded
for violations corroborates this argument. Id. Therefore, the NCAA can no longer clutch onto
either Board of Regents or McCormack as justifications of their restrictions.
205. See Law v. NCAA, 902 F. Supp. 1394, 1405 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing NCAA v. Board
of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)). In Law, the District Court recognized that the Supreme Court
applied the quick look rule of reason standard in Board of Regents. Id. Also, the court specified
that quick look rule of reason would be applied in cases where per se condemnation is
inappropriate, but where no elaborate industry analysis is necessary to show the anti-competitive
character of the restraint. Id.
206. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
207. Yancey, supra note 92, at 677.
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met.2 8 The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that the restriction
promotes a pro-competitive objective to justify the anti-competitive
effects.20 9 Under this test, the court presumes that the restraint has anti-
competitive effects and focuses its analysis on the defendant's
justifications.
2 10
A second quick look rule of reason approach was applied by the
Supreme Court in Board of Regents. Under this approach, a court
would presume that the restraint impairs competition.28P A court then
gives looks to the justifications to determine if the defendant's claims are
legitimate and capable of proof, a court will proceed with a rule of reason
approach.213
Board of Regents dealt with an NCAA regulation that prevented any
university from taking part in an agreement with NBC that would allow
college football teams to make more than six yearly television
214appearances. The Supreme Court struck down the restriction because it
found that the NCAA's control over television broadcasting represented an
illegal price fix.2 1 The Court refused to apply the per se rule, and instead
relied on the District Court's findings to confirm the restriction's anti-
competitive effects.2 16 The Court then took a quick look at the objectives
of the restraint and found them to be legitimate.2 17  However, upon
applying the rule of reason analysis, the Court held that the restrictions did
208. Id. The burden is met not by the plaintiff's showing of fact, but by the court's
determination. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02. Under this approach, while the nature of
the restraint may allow the court to determine the anti-competitive effects quickly, the court will
still review the nature of the restraint and its justifications to determine if the restraint has pro-
competitive effects. Yancey, supa note 92, at 680.
212. Yancey, supra note 92, at 679.
213. Id.
214. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 94. In addition, under the agreement, all teams
received the same fee for a televised game regardless of public standing. Id. at 93.
215. Id. at 86.
216. Id. at 98-100 (citing Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1300-01 (W.D.
Okla. 1982)). The District Court had made a full inquiry into the NCAA's power over the
market, the effect of the restraints, the justifications, and the alternatives. See Board of Regents
v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1297-1318.
217. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02; see also Yancey, supra note 92, at 681
n.133. The Court determined anti-competitive effects prior to deciding if justifications existed.
However, it is clear from the discussion of anti-competitive effects that the Court already
determined that the justifications warranted a more extensive review.
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not achieve the NCAA's goals, and therefore the anti-competitive effects
could not be justified.21 8
b. Application to Restrictions on Compensation
Applying either test presents a student-athlete with a viable challenge
to NCAA restrictions on compensation. Under the Brown approach, a
court would presume that the restrictions on compensation were anti-
competitive and would look at the pro-competitive objectives proffered by
the NCAA. 2  As stated in the previous section, the argument the NCAA
has traditionally made to justify its rules is that they are necessary to
preserve education and amateurism in college sports. However, it has
become increasinlv apparent that NCAA rules do not help promote these
stated objectives. Therefore, because the pro-competitive justifications
for the restraints would fail under the Brown test, the NCAA regulations
on compensation would be invalidated.
Likewise, in applying the Board of Regents approach, a court would
again presume that the restraints are anti-competitive in nature. However,
application of this test would compel a court to determine whether the
NCAA's justifications are legitimate. Assuming that a court would accept
the preservation of education and amateurism as legitimate, it would then
apply the rule of reason test. Applying the rule of reason test, a court
would find that NCAA rules on compensation are geared more toward
suppressing costs, rather than promoting education and amateurism.
Consequently, even under the Board of Regents approach, a court could
find the NCAA regulations violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.
V. REVENUE SHARING-THE CURE FOR THE EVILS OF THE PAST
In response to growing public support for compensating student-
athletes, and to further protect itself against future antitrust violations, the
NCAA has created alternatives that offer illusions of compensation.
22 1
However, these programs, which include allowing student-athletes to hold
218. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113-20. The Supreme Court's opinion in Board of
Regents is often cited as an example of the quick look standard. See, e.g., Law, 902 F. Supp. at
1405. The Court in Board of Regents did not summarily condemn the restraint as price fixing,
even though it noted that the action would normally be illegal per se. Yancey, supra note 92, at
681.
219. Yancey, supra note 92, at 677.
220. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.b.ii.(a)-(b).
221. See discussion supra Part III.B.1-2.
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part-time jobs, place too great a hardship on the athletes without providing
legitimate compensation.
The NCAA must acknowledge that the commercialism present in the
existing system has led to the growth and prosperity of colleges and
universities at the expense of their student-athletes. Therefore, the NCAA
must institute a revenue-sharing plan between student-athletes and the
colleges they represent in order to give these athletes the compensation
they deserve. Only then will the NCAA be promoting equality instead of
exploitation within the college athletic system.
A. Proposed Revenue-Sharing Plan
Revenue sharing essentially involves the practice of pooling together
revenue from agreed-upon sources and then distributing it among the
parties to the agreement. All four professional sports leagues have some
form of revenue sharing between the ownership and players dealing with
merchandising.224 In addition, many conferences within the NCAA use
revenue sharing to divide yearly earnings among its members
institutions.
225
This Comment proposes that the NCAA amend section 12.02.2 of its
Constitution226 so that student-athletes may receive a portion of the
revenue generated by their team. This Part discusses the elements of the
proposed revenue-sharing program, a copy of which is attached to this
Comment in the Appendix, and identifies the existing NCAA regulations
that would need to be repealed or amended to implement such a program.
1. Part A-Seniority-Based System
The current system, with its focus on scholarships, represents the
traditional means by which to compensate student-athletes.227 While sole
222. See discussion supra Part II.C.
223. Julie A. Garcia, The Future of Sports Merchandising Licensing, 18 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 219, 223 (1995).
224. Id. at 226-30 (including the National Football League ("NFL"), National Basketball
Association ("NBA"), Major League Baseball ("MLB"), and National Hockey League
("NHL")).
225. Schmadtke, supra note 6, at 10C.
226. Section 12.02.2 defines "pay" as the receipt of funds, awards, or benefits not
permitted by the governing legislation for participation in athletics. Section 12.1.1(b) revokes a
student-athlete's eligibility if they receive any pay as defined in section 12.02.2. Therefore, by
changing the Constitution and "permitting" pay in the form of funds received from the revenue-
sharing plan, the NCAA would bring the Plan within the standard parameters. NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 3, art. 12, §§ 12.02.2, 12.1.1.
227. See Schott, supra note 1, at 26.
REVENUE SHARING IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS
reliance on the current system is not viable in the face of the vast
commercialism in collegiate sports,228 it does present a sound foundation
upon which the proposed plan may build. Namely, scholarships providing
room, books, and board should continue to be given to each student-
athlete.229
However, in addition to scholarships, Part III of the Plan includes a
base system of monetary rewards available to all student-athletes. The
Plan allows student-athletes participating on both men's and women's
teams to share in the net profits generated by their teams. 230 NCAA Rule
15.2 would have to be amended in order to allow for revenue sharing. In
addition, Rule 12.1.1 would have to be repealed in part and amended in
part to implement the various forms of compensation that would be
available to student-athletes under this plan.
The Plan also considers the relative costs associated with each sport,
which leads to the focus on sharing the net, rather than gross, profits
generated by each team. Consequently, if a certain team, for some reason
fails to make any profit for that school year, each student-athlete on that
team would rely on their scholarship as their sole means of
compensation. 231 The focus on a seniority-based system would reward
student-athletes for their continued contribution and loyalty to the athletic
departments of their respective school.
232
228. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
229. Accordingly, NCAA Rule 15.2 regarding permissible financial aid should not be
repealed, but should be amended in consideration of the proposed bonus elements derived in
this section.
230. If the 1996-97 athletics figures were used, Charles Woodson of the University of
Michigan football team would have made $77,939. See University of Michigan 1996-97 Equity
in Athletics Disclosure Report, Oct. 6, 1997, tbl. 10 (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter Michigan Disclosure Report]. This figure is derived
by taking the Michigan football team's total regular season profits of $10,391,905 and dividing
the money according to the percentages set forth in Part III of the Plan. Id. In comparison, Kara
Wolters of the University of Connecticut women's basketball team would have made $8272
according to the base system. See University of Connecticut 1996-97 Equity in Athletics
Disclosure Report, Oct. 10, 1997, tbl. 10 (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment
Law Journal) [hereinafter UConn Disclosure Report].
231. For example, during the 1996-97 season, the University of Tennessee women's
basketball program won the NCAA championship, but actually lost money. See University of
Tennessee 1996-97 Equity in Athletics Disclosure Report, Sept. 24, 1997, tbl. 10 (on file with
the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter Tennessee Disclosure
Report]. Recognize that this portion of the Plan involves "base" compensation. Therefore, if a
star student-athlete happens to play on a team that does not make a profit for that school year,
they are not prevented from receiving any form of compensation. Instead, the student-athlete, if
they qualify, can gain revenue from any of the other three areas that will be discussed.
232. "Years of service" is a more accurate measure than class-standing (e.g., freshman,
sophomore, etc.) in college sports because the student-athlete's class standing at the university
may not be representative of the number of years they have participated with the athletic team.
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The division of revenues would be as follows: (1) each player in his
or her fourth year of participation would receive 1% of all revenues
generated for that year; (2) each player in his or her third year would
receive 0.75%; (3) each player in his or her second year would receive
0.5%; (4) each player in his or her first year would receive 0.25% of the
revenue.233 Any money remaining after sharing the revenues would go to
the athletic department to pay for miscellaneous expenses associated with
the athletic program.
234
2. Post-Season Compensation
An additional area in which student-athletes could receive a share of
the revenues is the monetary rewards offered to teams that participate in
post-season tournaments. For many schools, the revenues collected during
these games provide for large profits.235  While these earnings are
generally divided among all the members in the conference, 2 36 the revenue
distributed to each school remains substantial.237
Schools and student-athletes should set up a system of revenue
distribution. For example, a 65% to 35% distribution in favor of the
university should provide for legitimate compensation while allowing the
See Michigan University Football 1996 Roster, available in UNIvERsrrY OF MIcHIGAN MEDIA
GUIDE (Univ. of Mich. Athletic Dep't ed., 1996). For example, Michigan football player Zach
Adami was listed as a "senior" and traditionally considered to be a fourth-year student, even
though 1996 was his third year on the team. See id.
233. Even these small percentages can add up to a substantial sum when factored into the
revenues generated by present-day intercollegiate teams. For example, consider a college
football program that has a net profit of $1 million over the course of the year. Now imagine
that this football team has 80 players, consisting of 25 seniors, 20 juniors, 20 sophomores, and
15 freshmen. If all the seniors receive 1% of the profits, they would each get $10,000; juniors
would receive $7500, sophomores $5000, and freshmen $2500. The use of $1 million in net
profit is reasonable considering the fact that the average college makes more than $4 million
annually on football and men's basketball, which translates to about $2 million for each team.
See McGraw et al., supra note 123, at Al.
234. A system using the figures stated above would not drain the athletic program of all
revenues. For example, using a hypothetical team of 80 football players, the cost of making
payments to all the players is $537,500. Therefore, the university still has $462,500 to spend on
other pressing needs.
235. See Davis, supra note 49, at 254-55. During the 1996-97 season, the SEC received
$9 million from the NCAA men's basketball tournament and an additional $2.9 million from the
Conference's own men's basketball tournament. See Wendell Barnhouse, Big 12 Conference,
Though Young, Is Pulling in the Cash, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 5, 1997, (Sports),
at 6. Alternatively, the 1997-98 college "bowl games" earned the Big 10 Conference $26.9
million. See With Bowl Lineups Decided, Networks Seek to Ease Glut, SPORTS INDUS. NEWS,
Dec. 12, 1997, at 478.
236. See Davis, supra note 49, at 255.
237. For example, the 11 schools in the Big 10 Conference would each receive
approximately $2.4 million from the football revenues generated from bowl games.
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student-athlete to share in the profits of a successful playoff run.
However, instead of dividing the revenues according to "years of service,"
playoff money generated by each respective team should be divided
according to the role each student-athlete plays in the post-season. The
focus on athletic performance, and not on seniority, is more important
when dealing with playoff earnings because not every university qualifies
238for the playoffs. Therefore, even if the key players on a playoff team
are in their second or third year of service, the Plan rewards them for their
accomplishments instead of punishing them for their youth. Consequently,
of the 35% of the profits given to student-athletes, 50% should go to the
starters on the team, 35% should go to "key reserves," and 15% should go
to the remaining players.
239
3. Athletic and Academic All-Americans
An additional way to compensate student-athletes would be to
increase the amount of money they may receive for academic and athletic
awards. While the NCAA does not officially sponsor "All-American"
teams, they do recognize and accept its connection to college sports.
240
However, the NCAA limits the amount of compensation a student-athlete
may receive in achieving these prestigious awards to $300.24 1 Therefore,
under the revenue-sharing plan, the $300 limit would be increased to allow
academically and athletically gifted individuals greater compensation for
their outstanding performances.
Each year, certain newspapers and magazines select All-American
teams made up of the best players at each position in both basketball and
football. 242 Because the NCAA does not currently sponsor any individual
238. In college football, there are only 42 bowl invitations available for all Division I
football programs. See With Bowl Lineups Decided, supra note 235, at 478.
239. The distribution of playoff money using the Big 10 football revenues (assuming a
football team of 80 players) would fall along these lines. The football team would receive
$840,000 (35% of the $2.4 million). Assuming there are 22 starters on the team, each starter
would receive $19,000 (because the starters receive 50% of the total, or $420,000, to divide
amongst themselves). Furthermore, assuming there are 28 "key reserves" and the remaining 30
players are bench players, they would receive $10,500 and $4200 respectively. During the
1996-97 football post-season, University of Tennessee star quarterback Peyton Manning would
have received $10,142 through the system set forth in Part V of the Plan. See Tennessee
Disclosure Report, supra note 231, tbl. 10; see also Alliance Comes Under Fire as Upsets Roil
Bowl Pairings, SPORTS INDUS. NEWS, Dec. 13, 1996, at 485.
240. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 16, § 16.1.4.2.
241. Id. art. 16, § 16.1.4.2.1. Under the proposed revenue-sharing plan, this section would
have to be amended to allow a higher limit on the amount of money an award winning student-
athlete may receive.
242. See The Sporting News All-American Team, SPORTING NEWS, Mar. 17, 1997, at S-28
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All-American team, the opportunity exists for the NCAA to create its own
annual team. Alternatively, the NCAA could choose to officially sponsor
any one of the existing All-American teams. In exchange for the
opportunity to be selected as the official NCAA-sponsored All-American
team, these newspapers or magazines could pay a fee to the NCAA.
2 4 3
The NCAA could use these fees to reward the student-athletes chosen as
All-Americans in their respective sports. For example, first team All-
Americans would receive a $2500 award, and second team All-Americans
would receive a $1000 award.
244
In addition, because the NCAA purports to draw a connection
between athletics and education,245 lucrative awards should be given to all
student-athletes who succeed both athletically and academically. General
Telephone & Electric ("GTE") currently sponsors an Academic All-
American Team consisting of student-athletes chosen for their academic
and athletic prowess by the College Sports Information Directors of
America ("CoSIDA").246  The GTE Academic All-American Team
annually honors almost 700 student-athletes in five men's and women's
sports.247  These Academic All-Americans should each receive a $2500
award for their performances in the classroom and on the playing field.248
In order to generate the revenue for these awards, each NCAA
member school should donate $1500. Considering that the NCAA has
(naming the 1996-97 Sporting News All-American Team for College Basketball); see also All-
Americas, STREET & SMrrH'S COLLEGE FOOTBALL, 1997, at 15-16 (naming the 1997 Street &
Smith's All-American Team for College Football).
243. Because All-American teams usually generate fan interest, there would be an
incentive for all newspapers and magazines to be distinguished as the "official" periodical of the
NCAA.
244. Consequently, a sponsor or sponsors for the men's and women's All-American
basketball teams would donate $35,000 each year ($25,000 for the five men's and five women's
first team All-Americans and $10,000 for the second team All-Americans). Charles Woodson,
as a 1997-98 First Team All-American, would receive $2500 pursuant to Part V of the revenue-
sharing Plan. See Lake Mary's Kessler Chosen All-American, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 10,
1997, at C3.
245. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 2, § 2.9.
246. GTE Homepage, GTE Academic All-America Teams Program (visited Oct. 23, 1997)
<http://www.gte.com> (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal). In
order to be eligible, student-athletes must hold a minimum 3.20 cumulative grade point average
while being a starter or key reserve on their respective team, and have reached their sophomore
year of college. Id.
247. Id. The five men's sports are football, basketball, baseball, and two at-large sports
chosen from the various athletic programs offered at universities throughout the country. The
women's sports include volleyball, basketball, softball, and two at-large sports. Id.
248. Peyton Manning, as a 1997-98 Academic All-American, would receive the $2500
bonus under Part V.B of the revenue-sharing Plan. See GTE Academic All-American Team,
Dec. 9, 1997, at I (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
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over 1000 members, 249 $1.5 million of the necessary $1.75 million would
be generated. The additional $250,000 could be donated by either GTE,
other corporate sponsors, or by private donors. Additionally, special
recognition should be given to student-athletes who qualify for both the
first team All-American and academic All-American teams by having their
awards doubled in recognition of their achievement. 25 The money used
for these bonuses could be provided for by the NCAA, its member
schools, 25 1 or through private donations. Considering the popularity of
collegiate athletics and the honorable goals established by the Academic
All-American program, it should be fairly easy to generate the additional
fumds needed.
4. Endorsements
The boom in collegiate athletic merchandise curren tly provides
colleges and universities with their own private gold mines. 25  The time
has come for the universities to share these riches with student-athletes,
who are mainly responsible for merchandise popularity. Large schools,
such as the University of Nebraska, earn $2 million each year through
licensing deals.253 Up to this point, however, student-athletes have been
restricted from using their name or image in a commercial product.
254
Therefore, colleges and universities have been able to keep all the profits
from these endorsements even though most consumers buy these products
due to their association with certain players and their respective schools.
255
In order to destroy this inequality, colleges and universities should
allow student-athletes to get a portion of the merchandising and
endorsement revenues they create. The distribution of endorsement
249. Goldman, supra note 4, at 209.
250. Therefore, instead of merely receiving $5000 ($2500 for being a first team All-
American and $2500 for being a first team academic All-American), the student-athlete should
receive a $10,000 award. During the 1996-97 season, four student-athletes in football achieved
this honor: Peyton Manning of Tennessee, Brian Lee of the University of Wyoming, Grant
Wistrom of the University of Nebraska, and Chad Kessler of Louisiana State University. See
Lake Mary's Kessler Chosen All-American, supra note 244, at C3; see also GTE Academic All-
American Team, supra note 248, at 1.
251. If the member schools were responsible for paying the bonuses of the four men's
football academic/athletic first team All-Americans, each school would have to donate an extra
$20 to its initial $1500 donation.
252. See Belo, supra note 4, at 134.
253. McGraw et al., supra note 123, at Al.
254. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12, § 12.5.2.1. Pursuant to the revenue-sharing
plan, this article should be amended to allow student-athletes to share in team merchandising
revenues and collect a percentage of revenues for individual endorsement contracts.
255. See Belo, supra note 4, at 146.
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revenue can take one of three forms. The first is dividing a portion of all
fees collected by the university through licensing agreements. Each
university that signs a licensing agreement should allocate 35% of the
profits to the athletic department. The athletic department could then
divide these profits equally among all participating student-athletes.
2 5 6
Another type of endorsement distribution involves the sponsorship of
individual teams by product manufacturers. For example, Nike pays the
Penn State University football team $5 million a year to place its logo on
their uniforms.25 7  If Penn State University would allow 20% of this
revenue to be divided among its football players, each player would
receive a generous reward.
25 8
Finally, the NCAA should allow student-athletes to endorse products
both nationally and locally.2 59  While the value of these endorsements
would be difficult to predict under current NCAA regulations, there is
some evidence that a "star" student-athlete could easily receive a six-figure
salary for endorsing a product. 26  NCAA rules should consequently be
changed to allow these student-athletes to receive 80% of all endorsement
revenue they individually generate.
261
256. The University of Nebraska, for example, generated $2 million in licensing deals. See
McGraw et al., supra note 123, at Al. Thirty-five percent of that figure is $700,000. Schools
often have about 500 participating student-athletes each year. See UConn Disclosure Report,
supra note 230, at 1; University of Southern California 1996-97 Equity in Athletics Disclosure
Report, Oct. 1, 1997, at I (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal)
[hereinafter USC Disclosure Report]; University of California at Los Angeles 1996-97 Equity in
Athletics Disclosure Report, Oct. 15, 1997, at 1 (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter UCLA Disclosure Report]. Therefore, under Part VI.B
of the revenue-sharing Plan, each student-athlete would receive an equal portion of the school's
licensing revenue.
257. Finney, supra note 14, at DI.
258.. Twenty percent of the revenues from the contract signed with Nike would amount to
$1 million. If the Penn State football team consisted of 80 players, each player would receive
$12,500 according to Part VI.B of the Plan.
259. Current NCAA regulations allow student-athletes to appear in advertisements for any
charitable, educational, or nonprofit organization. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12, §
12.5.1.1.2. Under the revenue-sharing program, this rule would be amended to allow student-
athletes to take part in commercial advertising.
260. Upon leaving college in 1995, Ki-Jana Carter of Penn State University received
$500,000 in endorsements, while Drew Bledsoe of Washington State University received
$700,000, after leaving college in 1993. See THE 1997 INFORMATION PLEASE SPORTS
ALMANAC 584 (John Hassan ed., 1997). In addition, agent David Ware predicts that Charles
Woodson, this year's Heisman Trophy winner, may receive over a million dollars in
endorsements before he is officially drafted by an NFL team. See Angelique S. Chengelis,
Woodson on Track to be Marketing Hit, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 15, 1997, at D1.
261. The 80% figure is used for simplicity. Allowing student-athletes to receive 80% of all
their endorsement contracts recognizes the economic value of their athletic abilities while
compensating the university for providing them with a forum to display their talents. A star
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Therefore, the proposed revenue-sharing Plan works to equalize
profit in collegiate athletics without destroying the current system. The
excess profits generated by universities in certain sports are used to help
fund the needs of other "non-revenue" sports.262 The revenue-sharing plan
recognizes this need by allowing each university to receive the majority of
all revenues generated. However, by allowing student-athletes to share in
this revenue, a balanced medium will be established between the student-
athletes and the universities they represent.
263
B. Benefits of Revenue Sharing-Avoiding Antitrust Scrutiny
One of the main benefits of revenue sharing is that the NCAA avoids
possible antitrust violations. The main complaint concerning current
NCAA rules is that they restrict student-athletes from selling their athletic
skills to the highest bidder. 264 A revenue-sharing plan allows the student-
athlete to choose a school not only for the academic and athletic
opportunities it offers, but also for the economic benefits it provides. The
student-athlete would be able to better ascertain his or her athletic value
and choose the school that offers the most lucrative rewards-in essence,
the highest bidder.
Those universities that seek to recruit "star" athletes would have to
emphasize the economic opportunities available to each recruit should they
attend the school and succeed in their academic and athletic ventures. By
implementing such a system, each NCAA member school would be
actively competing with one another for each recruit. The current system
does not foster true competition because the NCAA and its member
schools have jointly agreed to limit costs by refusing to pay compensation.
A revenue-sharing plan would stop this exploitation and direct the NCAA
toward the true competition envisioned by current antitrust laws.
Critics may argue that such a plan sacrifices smaller schools who do
not have the economic capital to compete with larger universities.
student-athlete such as Charles Woodson or Peyton Manning could have received anywhere
from $500,000 to over $1 million in endorsements. See THE 1997 INFORMATION PLEASE
SPORTS ALMANAC, supra note 260, at 584; see also Chengelis, supra note 260, at D1.
Therefore, pursuant to Part VI.C of the revenue-sharing Plan, these athletes could receive
anywhere from $400,000 to $800,000 from endorsements.
262. Finney, supra note 14, at DI.
263. If the revenue-sharing Plan was implemented during the 1996-97 season, under Parts
II-IV both Charles Woodson and Peyton Manning would have earned well over $1 million. In
comparison, Brian Lee of the University of Wyoming, a first team All-American and first team
Academic All-American football player, would have received about $28,000 for his academic
and athletic achievements.
264. Chin, supra note 4, at 1232.
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However, just because a university does not produce successful athletic
teams does not mean that they cease to exist. 265 Many schools break even
or lose money on their athletics programs, yet remain viable.266  The
revenue-sharing Plan's focus on "profits" allows smaller schools to
survive within the present commercial system. Smaller schools can adapt
to the current environment by not relying on the athletics department as
their primary means of support. Instead, they can look towards other more
traditional elements, such as private donations or student tuition to
generate the revenue they need to operate.
267
Some critics may object to the fact that a revenue-sharing plan
destroys amateurism and turns the focus away from true notions of
education. However, the demise of education and true notions of
amateurism within collegiate athletics is connected to the growing
commercialism inherent in the present environment. The current focus on
commercialism has driven universities to recruit money-making "athletes"
instead of "students." 268  In addition, certain NCAA athletic rules focus
more on limiting a student-athlete's economic opportunities rather than
their educational growth.
269
265. Ivy League schools have chosen not to bid for student-athletes' services by not
providing athletic scholarships. See Goldman, supra note 4, at 248. However, it is
unreasonable to believe these schools go unnoticed just because of their lack of athletic
tradition.
266. For example, the University of Connecticut athletic department lost over $70,000 in
1996-97, but continues to be widely regarded both academically and athletically. See UConn
Disclosure Report, supra note 230, tbl. 10.
267. Certain schools have chosen to deflect reliance on their athletics programs. Those
schools, like those in the Ivy League, that do not offer athletic scholarships put themselves at a
recruiting disadvantage with other schools offering athletic scholarships. Consequently, the
schools belonging to the Ivy League will generally not recruit the best high school athletes from
year to year. Because their teams are less talented than those of recognizable schools, it is more
difficult for these athletic teams to profit from post-season tournaments or endorsements. Thus,
the Ivy League schools accept that their athletic teams will not generate huge profits and adjust
their budgets around this fact.
268. Certain bowl games, like the Orange Bowl, pay each participating team $8.47 million.
See With Bowl Lineups Decided, supra note 235, at 478. Because of these monetary rewards,
coaches are pressured into producing winning teams under the threat of getting fired. See
Goldman, supra note 4, at 241. This pressure leads to coaches recruiting students who may not
be ready for a college curriculum, but who are chosen solely for their academic talents. Id.
269. The NCAA Division I Manual has only one section and two subdivisions covering the
academic performances of student-athletes. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 14, §§
14.01.2, 14.4. Additionally, these rules fail to specify what steps a university should take in
helping a failing student succeed academically. Id. In relation, the Manual contains numerous
sections restricting student-athletes from receiving any compensation above that approved by
the NCAA. See id. art. 12 (defining amateurism), art. 15 (determining financial aid), art. 16
(restricting award benefits), art. 19 (enforcing NCAA rules), and art. 22 (setting forth football
television plan regulations). Therefore, it is apparent that the NCAA is implicitly more
concered with keeping money away from student athletes than they are with providing them
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If the NCAA was concerned with promoting amateurism, they would
have to throw away all vestiges of commercialism, compel its member
schools to recruit "students" over "athletes," and focus budgets on
education. However, it is unlikely that the NCAA will throw away its $1.7
billion television contract with CBS270 or $270 million in projected
revenues from other TV contracts and licensing deals.271  It could be
argued that the revenue sharing plan may be the lesser of two evils.
However, it is the product of an evil-the NCAA's exploitation of student-
athletes-that current NCAA policies fail to address.
In the current commercial environment, it is more equitable to
sacrifice notions of amateurism in order to allow student-athletes to share
in the revenues they generate, instead of allowing certain schools to flaunt
the hypocrisy of education in order to keep costs down. Perhaps the real
answer is for the NCAA to destroy all commercialism present in collegiate
athletics so that athletic departments would make just enough to pay for
their needs, instead of producing huge profits each year. Consequently,
student-athletes could not complain that they are not receiving a "fair"
share of the revenues they generate. Some believe that, realistically, this is
an option that the NCAA is unlikely to consider.
272
C. Title IX Implications on the Revenue-Sharing Plan
Perhaps the most pressing problem related to the implementation of
the revenue-sharing Plan is that it may force universities to violate Title IX
of the Education Amendments Act of 1972. 273 Title IX was enacted to
combat gender discrimination in educational programs and activities
receiving federal funding.274  Concerns may be raised that the
implementation of the revenue sharing plan would inhibit universities from
achieving true gender equity in their athletic programs.
with a good education.
270. This deal allows CBS to telecast the Men's Basketball Tournament through 2002.
Finney, supra note 14, at Dl.
271. See McGraw et. al., supra note 123, at Al.
272. Tom McMillen, a member of the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate
Athletics, which unsuccessfully attempted to reform college sports, summed up his current
pessimism with NCAA policies when he said, "[M]oney drives [the NCAA].... greed drives
it." Id.; see also Study Discovers NCAA is Quite a Money Machine, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at
C20.
273. See Schott, supra note 1, at 49.
274. Renee Forseth et al., Progress in Gender Equity?: An Overview of the History and
Future of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 51, 54
(1995).
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1. Judicial Interpretation of Title IX
In Cohen v. Brown University,2 7 5 a district court explained the impact
Title IX could have upon an entire collegiate athletic program.276  The
District Court concluded that Brown University violated Title IX by failing
to provide women athletes with an equal opportunity to participate in
intercollegiate athletics.2 77 In coming to this conclusion, the District Court
developed the "policy interpretation" test consisting of three prongs: (1)
substantial proportionality; (2) continuingractice of program expansion;
and (3) full and effective accommodation. In applying the test to Brown
University's athletic program, the court found that Brown failed to satisfy
any of the three prongs.
Courts have generally relied on the three-prong policy interpretation
test to determine whether intercollegiate athletic programs are in
compliance with Title IX.280  Courts applying the test implicitly
demonstrate that proportionality is the key to Title IX compliance.
2
91
Under present conditions it is difficult to effectively accommodate women
without first achieving gender equality. 2 82 Therefore, if an institution does
275. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
276. Teresa M. Miguel, Title IX and Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: Case
Analyses, Legal Implications, and the Movement Toward Compliance, 1 SPORTS LAWS. J. 279,
289 (1994). Cohen involved a class-action suit by female student-athletes at Brown University
alleging that Brown's demotion of women's gymnastics and volleyball teams to club status
violated Title IX, and denied them an equal opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athletics.
Forseth, supra note 274, at 69.
277. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 999.
278. Id. at 989. Substantial proportionality can be satisfied if the university can show that
athletic participation opportunities for men and women are provided in proportion to the
enrollment ratio between men and women. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 896 (1st
Cir. 1993). Program expansion can be proven if the university can show a history and
continuing practice of program expansion that is responsive to women. Id. Finally, the
university can prove effective accommodation by showing that the interests and abilities of
women have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program. Id.
279. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 981. Brown University failed the first prong of the test
because a 11.6% disparity existed between the percentage of women enrolled and the number of
participating women athletes at the university. Id. Brown University also failed the second
prong by not providing a continuing practice of program expansion for women's athletics. Id.
Finally, by denying the women's volleyball and gymnastics teams full varsity status, Brown
University was not accommodating the interests and abilities of female athletes. Id.
280. See, e.g., Favia v. Indiana Univ. ofPa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that when a
university is faced with program cuts, it will not be allowed to terminate any women's sports
when it has failed to comply with Title IX); Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507
(D. Colo. 1993) (allowing a preliminary injunction reinstating the Colorado State University
women's softball team).
281. Miguel, supra note 276, at 296.
282. Id. at 297. To date, no school has successfully shown effective accommodations
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not comply with the proportionality aspect of the three-prong test, the
institution likely violates Title IX.
2 83
2. Revenue Sharing and Proportionality
Many intercollegiate athletic programs do not comply with the
proportionality requirements of Title IX.284 Consequently, the fear is that
a revenue-sharing plan would take money away from the athletic
department in favor of the student-athletes, making it impossible for the
athletic department to fund women's teams and thus come within the
guidelines imposed by Title IX.285 Therefore, this section will focus on
four alternatives that may be implemented to help achieve gender equity
while providing for economic balance.
a. Raising Revenues, Cutting Waste
The NCAA and its member schools should concentrate on other
revenue-raising techniques. In order to raise new revenue, the NCAA
could place a surcharge on the price of admission tickets and stadium
286
concessions. Each university could use the money generated from the
ticket tax to fund existing women's programs, or to create more athletic
opportunities for women. Furthermore, the NCAA could create its own
fund of ticket tax revenues that could be distributed to those schools with
serious proportionality problems.
28 7
where gender equity does not exist. Id.
283. Id.
284. At the University of Michigan, men make up 50.4% of all undergraduates, and women
make up 49.6%. See Michigan Disclosure Report, supra note 230, at 1. However, when it
comes to athletics participation, men make up 55.1% of all student-athletes while women make
up 44.9%. Id. UCLA has 48% male undergraduates and 52% female undergraduates, but 61%
male student-athletes, compared to 39% female student athletes. UCLA Disclosure Report,
supra note 256, at 1. USC has 52% male undergraduates, 48% female undergraduates, but
57.5% male student-athletes compared to 42.5% female student-athletes. USC Disclosure
Report, supra note 256, at 1.
285. See Sherman Act Invalidation, supra note 4, at 1317. If colleges pay certain student-
athletes, they will have less money to fund non-revenue producing sports. Id. Most women's
athletics programs do not make money. See, e.g., UCLA Disclosure Report, supra note 256, tbl.
10. During the 1996-97 season, the UCLA women's basketball team operated at a deficit of
$491,691. Id.
286. See Gregory Clay, Tax on Tickets Could Help Pay Student-Athletes, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 8, 1997, (Sports), at 1.
287. The NCAA could create these sums by taxing the tickets sold for the NCAA Men's
and Women's Basketball Tournaments. The two tournaments are run exclusively by the NCAA,
and therefore these figures would not be considered as part of any university's individual profit.
See McGraw et al., supra note 123, at Al. In 1997, the NCAA made $4.1 million from ticket
sales for the "Final Four" (the Final Four includes the Men's and Women's Basketball
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In addition, the NCAA could use some of the profits gathered from
miscellaneous sources to help create gender equity. The NCAA is
currently under a $1.7 billion television contract with CBS for the
exclusive rights to televise the men's and women's basketball
tournament. M The NCAA is also slated to receive $50 million in cash as
an incentive to move its offices from Kansas City, Kansas to Indianapolis,
Indiana.2 89 It is imperative for the NCAA to share these profits with their
member schools in order to comply with Title IX.
Finally, there is tremendous opportunity for the NCAA to generate
funds for gender equity programs if it discontinues its wasteful spending
practices and huge administrative benefits. For example, the manual for
cities holding the Final Four requires a series of gifts to be delivered to the
hotel rooms of NCAA officials. 290  These momentos cost the city of
Indianapolis an estimated $25,000 when it hosted the 1996 Final Four.
2 91
In addition, the NCAA mandated that 10% of all tickets to the Final Four
be distributed to their employees and commandeered some of the best
luxury boxes for their own officials. 292 Consequently, instead of gathering
ticket revenue for these tickets and luxury boxes, all of which could be
used to aid member schools, the NCAA distributed these seats to their
loyal followers for free.
293
The NCAA is not the only entity engaged in wasteful indulgences.
Most of its member schools spend huge amounts of money to have their
teams travel in style. The University of Nebraska spent $1.7 million to
send 730 people, including coaches, athletic administrators, the board of
regents, the marching band, and 160 players-ninety-seven of whom
didn't play-to Florida for the 1997 Orange Bowl. 294  Additionally,
Kansas University spent an estimated $47,000 to have its own football
team stay at a local hotel before every home game. 295 By eliminating such
Tournaments semifinal games and the national championship game). Id. The NCAA sold
47,000 tickets to account for this revenue. Id. However, if the NCAA could place a $5
surcharge on each of these tickets, they could raise $235,000 to distribute to schools in need of
funding to achieve gender equity. In addition, during the tournament, temporary souvenir shops
peddled officially licensed NCAA goods with 7.5% of sales going to the NCAA. Id. Assuming
that $1 million worth of merchandise was sold, the NCAA would have an additional $75,000 to
use to promote equality in college athletics.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. McGraw et al., supra note 123, at Al. These gifts include a Samsonite suit bag, a
Final Four ticket embedded in Lucite, a Limoges porcelain basketball, and Steuben glass. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. Not staying on campus the night before the game supposedly helped the team
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unnecessary expenses, the NCAA and its member schools can provide
themselves with a substantial sum of money that could be used to promote
women's athletics.
b. Cutting Men's Sports
A more drastic way to generate money for women's sports while
reducing the gap between gender enrollment and athletic participation
figures is to cut men's sports. While male student-athletes argue that this
is reverse discrimination, courts have allowed universities to
disproportionately cut men's programs.296  Court decisions have
demonstrated that elimination of athletic programs, rather than expanding
programs that provide women with additional opportunities, is an
acceptable method of achieving compliance with Title IX.29 7  The
university would be able to use the savings to expand women's varsity
teams, thereby bringing the athletic program into compliance with Title
[X. 
2 9 8
c. Cutting the Size of Football Programs
For most universities, the men's football team is the largest of all
teams in the athletic program and accounts for the bulk of the
expenditures. 299 Most football programs at large universities across the
country have eighty-five athletes on scholarship and numerous other walk-
ons. N° However, arguments can be made that college football teams do
not have to be this large in order to be successful. A reduction in the size
of present-day college football teams would make more money available
to women's sports and would reduce the gap between undergraduate
enrollment of women and their participation in athletics.
focus on what they were doing, yet the football team only won one of their home games all year.
Id.
296. See, e.g., Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. III. 1993), aff'd, 35 F.3d
265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995) (holding that the elimination of the
men's varsity swimming team and not the women's team did not violate Title IX); Gonyo v.
Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (allowing the university to eliminate men's
wrestling without being liable for violating Title IX standards).
297. Forseth, supra note 274, at 92.
298. Id.
299. UCLA reported in 1996-97 that its football team consisted of 117 student-athletes and
had operating expenses of over $7 million. UCLA Disclosure Report, supra note 256, tbl. 7.
300. Susan M. Shook, The Title IX Tug-of-War and Intercollegiate Athletics in the 1990's:
Nonrevenue Men's Teams Join Women Athletes in the Scramble for Survival, 71 IND. L.J. 773,
810 (1996); see also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15, § 15.5.5.2. This NCAA rule allows
a maximum of 85 counters (i.e., scholarships) for each NCAA Division I-A football team. Id.
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College football coaches claim that student-athletes are more
susceptible to injuries because their academic requirements limit their
physical training time.301 Therefore, coaches argue that college players
may compromise their safety if the teams are reduced in size.30 2 However,
certain factors bring into question the credibility of this line of thought.
First, while National Football League ("NFL") teams limit rosters to only
forty-seven players, the league maintains the highest competitive level of
football in the country.303 In addition, most intercollegiate football teams
take "travel squads" of sixty to sixty-five players to away games, and
usually no more than forty-five players actually participate in the game.304
Therefore, if coaches believe that a sixty-five-man-squad is enough to
handle any injuries during a road game, it would logically follow that a
competitive football team could consist of only sixty-five members.
30 5
The benefits of limiting football teams to sixty-five players are
numerous. First and foremost is the fact that the team will save a
substantial amount in equipment costs.306 These savings could be passed
on to expand existing women's sports or to create new women's teams. In
addition, reducing the size of the football squads will bring each university
closer to the level of substantial proportionality mandated by Title IX.
307
Finally, reducing the number of football players per team may increase the308
level of competition in college football. The average level of player
ability at each university will rise as some of the "bench-warmers" at the
more successful schools become starting players at others. 309 This in turn
would raise the parity in college football and may generate more interest,
and consequently more revenues, for traditionally less competitive
universities.
301. Shook, supra note 300, at 811.
302. Id. Coaches argue that if there are smaller squads, injured players would have to
continue playing because of the lack of available replacements. See id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. For example, USC spent $2,432,492 on the equipment costs for 91 football players in
1996, an average of $26,730 per player. See USC Disclosure Report, supra note 256, tbl. 4. If
the football team was cut to sixty-five players, the savings in equipment costs would equate to
$694,980.
307. See Forseth, supra note 274, at 96. For example, at UCLA, reducing the number of
football players to 65 would decrease the male participation in athletics from 55.1% to 51.8%.
See UCLA Disclosure Report, supra note 256, at tbl. 1. Women athletics participation on the
other hand would be increased from 44.9% to 48.1%. Id. As a result, UCLA is closer to
satisfiing the substantial proportionality test because undergraduate enrollment consists of
50.4% men and 49.6% women. Id.
308. Shook, supra note 300, at 813.
309. Id.
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d. Effective Accommodation as a Substitute for Substantial
Proportionality
Although traditionally difficult to prove, the policy interpretation test
announced in Cohen allows universities to come within the boundaries of
Title IX if they can show that they are effectively accommodating the
needs of women athletes. 310  One commentator argues that as long as
universities fund similar men's and women's sports equally, they are
effectively accommodating the needs of their female student-athletes and
satisfying Title IX requirements. 3 1  For example, if a university budgets
the same amount of money for both men's and women's soccer teams, the
university has effectively accommodated all of its students' needs. 312 This
view is supported by Blair v. Washington.
313
In Blair, the Washington Supreme Court found that nothing in
Washington law required Washington State University ("WSU") to use
funds generated by football to support other sport programs. 314 Instead of
construing "equality of opportunity" to include equal access to another
sport's profits, the court construed it to mean equal opportunity to raise
315revenue.
Relying on the holding in Blair would establish some credibility to
the revenue-sharing Plan. As presented, the Plan allows members of each
men's and women's athletic teams to receive a portion of the profits they
generate. The revenue-sharing Plan affords both male and female student-
athletes with an equal opportunity to raise the revenues they will share
with the university. Consequently, under the reasoning in Blair, such a
plan would be consistent with Title IX.
310. See Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 989.
311. See Deidre G. Duncan, Gender Equity in Women's Athletics, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1027,
1053 (1996).
312. Id. at 1053-54.
313. 740 P.2d 1379 (Wash. 1987).
314. Id. at 1383-85. The plaintiffs in Blair brought suit under the Equal Rights
Amendment of the Washington State Constitution and Washington's "Law Against
Discrimination" rather than Title IX. Id. at 1379. Although the Washington court's ruling
cannot bind federal courts, the dicta is useful in providing a compromise between Title IX
regulations and revenue-producing sports. Duncan, supra note 311, at 1053.
315. Blair, 740 P.2d at 1383-85. Under Blair, in order to evaluate whether a university is
in compliance with Title IX, the nonrevenue-producing sports should be compared to each
other. Duncan, supra note 311, at 1053. Schools should compare the amount of money spent
for women's soccer to men's soccer, instead of comparing the whole men's athletic budget with
the whole women's athletic budget. Id. A claim for Title IX violations should be raised only if
there are differences between male and female funding within a particular sport. Id.
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The arguments raised in Blair may be criticized for implicitly
allowing sexist practices. Due to the fact that women's sports generally do
not generate profits,3 16 it is unlikely that female student-athletes would
have the same opportunities as their male counterparts to share in the
revenues they generate. However, the growth and popularity of women's
sports have allowed some universities to profit from their women's teams.
For example, at the University of Connecticut the women's basketball
team ended the 1996-97 school year with over $800,000 in profits.
317
Consequently, these women would be able to receive some economic
benefits under the revenue-sharing Plan. In addition, reliance on the other
alternatives used to create substantial proportionality within athletic
programs may help create more economic profits for women's athletics.
Reducing waste and the size of football teams allows more money to be
spent on women's athletic programs. This money can be used to buy
better equipment, hire more coaches, and help promote women's athletics
in general. As the competition level in women's athletics rises, so does
fan interest. Eventually, this fan interest may translate into substantial
profits and monetary bonuses for women athletes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The college experience presents many interesting avenues for
student-athletes to explore. They are able to meet new people, participate
in the sports they enjoy playing, and ideally, earn a degree. But one of the
more painful lessons each student-athlete must face is that they are subject
to some degree of exploitation. To be certain, a type of indentured
servitude taints college sports when universities profit from the
achievements of their student-athletes without adequately compensating
them for their time and effort. The arguments for restricting compensation
to student-athletes have become out-dated. The NCAA's alternatives to
providing compensation do not furnish most student-athletes with an
adequate means to survive through four years of college. In addition, the
NCAA's rules and regulations do more to destroy the notion of
amateurism than to foster it. If the courts applied either the traditional or
quick look rule of reason tests under federal antitrust law to the NCAA
rules, these regulations could be found to restrict competition
unreasonably. If anything, additional judicial pressure may entice the
NCAA and its member schools to change its system voluntarily.
316. For example, women's basketball at UCLA only generated $149,778 in revenues and
incurred expenses of $641,469. UCLA Disclosure Report, supra note 256, tbl. 10.
317. See UConn Disclosure Report, supra note 230, tbl. 10.
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A compelling solution to this problem exists in the form of revenue
sharing. A system of revenue sharing would provide student-athletes with
more equitable compensation, while still promoting both academics and
athletics. A revenue-sharing plan would not unnecessarily burden all
universities, but would ensure that those universities making a profit fairly
distribute these revenues to the student-athletes who helped raise the
funds. Finally, reliance on a revenue-sharing system would break the
chains of exploitation binding present-day collegiate athletics.
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APPENDIX
PROPOSAL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A REVENUE SHARING PLAN
BETWEEN NCAA MEMBER INSTITUTIONS AND STUDENT-ATHLETES
PART I-GOALS OF THE PLAN
The National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") seeks to
create a balance between education and athleticism in intercollegiate
sports. The NCAA also seeks to promote justice and equality for all of its
male and female student-athletes. The NCAA recognizes the important
role student-athletes play in the promotion of intercollegiate athletics and
acknowledges the time and sacrifice each student-athlete contributes to
their respective intercollegiate team.
In the current commercial environment, the student-athlete is not
equitably compensated for the contributions they make to intercollegiate
sports. Therefore, this Plan seeks to create an equitable financial balance
through the sharing of profits between the universities and their student-
athletes.
In doing so, the NCAA purports to fulfill its goals of creating a
balance between education and athletics, while providing for the protection
and equality of student-athletes. To ensure the continued fair promotion of
intercollegiate athletics, each student-athlete shall be able to participate in
the proceeds of their athletic contributions according to the specifications
set forth by this plan.
PART II-THE BASE SYSTEM
The revenue sharing plan acknowledges the important role that
athletic scholarships play in the educational and athletic growth of student-
athletes. Therefore, under the Plan, each university must provide athletic
scholarships for each deserving student-athlete. Each scholarship must
cover the yearly costs of tuition and comparable living expenses at the
university.
However, if the contributions of student-athletes lead to an additional
profit over the expenses needed to sustain the team, the university is
compelled to distribute this revenue fairly. In order to determine whether
a particular university-sponsored athletic team has generated a profit, each
university must produce a detailed accounting of the yearly revenues and
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expenses generated by each team. Each university must present this
accounting pursuant to the guidelines established by the Equity in
Athletics Disclosure Act of 1994. If these figures display a profit, the
university shall distribute the revenue among its student-athletes according
to the specifications set by Parts III through VI of this plan.
PART III-LENGTH OF SERVICE AWARDS
A major aspect of intercollegiate sports is the focus on helping
student-athletes earn an undergraduate degree. In order to foster this
notion, it is important to reward student-athletes for their continued
academic persistence and loyalty to their university-sponsored athletic
team. Therefore, if the student-athlete's team finishes the year with a
profit, the university shall initially distribute these funds depending on his
or her length of service.
Pursuant to the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act of 1994, each
university's annual report is only required to state each athletic team's
expenses and revenues. In their present form, these reports do not
distinguish between regular season and post-season revenues. Part IV of
the Plan focuses on the distribution of post-season revenues. Therefore,
before computing the figures for this part, each university must first
distinguish the revenues attributable solely to post-season play. The
distribution of the remaining "net profits" (after compensating the
university for the expenses associated with the team) are as follows: (1)
each student-athlete in the fourth year of active participation on the team
receives 1% of all revenues generated for that year; (2) each student-
athlete in the third year of active participation on the team receives 0.75%
of all revenues generated for that year; (3) each student-athlete in the
second year of active participation on the team receives 0.5% of all
revenues generated for that year; and (4) each student-athlete in the first
year of active participation on the team receives 0.25% of all revenues
generated for that year.
This part focuses on the "active" participation of student-athletes.
Therefore, student-athletes who did not participate on the team for one of
four eligible years as a result of being "red-shirted" shall not have this year
counted as an official year of participation.
Any profits remaining after the distribution of these revenues is to be
returned to the university's athletic department to be used for the
development or continuance of the existing university-sponsored athletic
teams.
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PART IV-POST-SEASON COMPENSATION
Each university-sponsored athletic team strives to reach both
academic and athletic success. One of the measures for the athletic
success of a team is the opportunity to become the national champion,
though participation in post-season tournaments. To declare a national
champion, most sports use a post-season tournament that sometimes
produces lucrative monetary rewards. These awards translate into
additional profits earned by each respective athletic team for their
university. Consequently, this part focuses on the fair distribution of these
post-season revenues.
In recognition of the costs needed to send athletic teams to post-
season tournaments, each university that has an athletic team participating
in post-season play is entitled to 65% of all the profits generated by its
team. The remaining 35% is to be distributed to the student-athletes as
follows: (1) 50% of the remaining profits shall be equally divided among
the "starters" on the team; (2) 35% of the remaining profits shall be
equally divided among the "key reserves" on the team; and (3) 15% of the
remaining profits shall be equally divided among the remaining members
of the team.
For the purposes of this part, the coaching staff of each team is
compelled to determine which student-athletes are the "starters" and "key
reserves" of the team. The university is to make the distribution of profits
solely on the designations agreed to by the coaching staff. In the best
interests of all coaching staffs, this part recommends these designations for
student-athletes: (1) "Starters" are those who are placed in the starting
lineup for over 70% of the games during both regular and post-season
play; (2) "Key Reserves" are those who either start less than 30% of every
regular and post-season play, or any student-athlete who does not start, yet
receives a substantial amount of playing time. In addition, student-athletes
who do not receive a substantial amount of playing time, but who the
coaching staff deems to be integral to important parts of each game shall
also be considered Key Reserves; and (3) any player not placed in either of
the two aforementioned categories is to be designated into his or her own
category.
PART V-ATHLETIC AND ACADEMIC ALL-AMERICANS
In order to promote an equitable balance between athletic and
academic success, the NCAA finds it crucial to compensate student-
athletes who succeed in both fields. Part V focuses on the distribution of
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funds for those student-athletes who achieve both athletic and academic
success.
Section A-Athletic All-Americans
The NCAA sponsors "Official" All-American teams for each sport.
Student-athletes named to the All-American team for their respective
sports are to receive an award as specified in this subsection. Student-
athletes named as a First Team All-American in their respective sport shall
receive a $2500 award. Student-athletes named as a Second Team All-
American in their respective sport shall receive a $1000 award.
Section B-Academic All-Americans
The NCAA officially recognizes GTE as the sponsor of the NCAA's
Academic All-American Team. In addition, GTE officially recognizes the
College Sports Information Directors of America ("CoSIDA") as the
governing body responsible for choosing the student-athletes for the
Academic All-American Teams in each respective sport. Any student-
athlete named as an Academic All-American in his or her respective sport
shall receive a $2500 award.
Section C-Athletic and Academic All-Americans
Student-athletes who achieve success both academically and
athletically display the ideal spirit behind intercollegiate sports. Therefore,
any student-athlete who is named to both the First Team All-American and
the Academic All-American Team in his or her respective sport shall have
the awards doubled to produce a $10,000 award.
PART VI-ENDORSEMENTS
In recognition of the contribution each student-athlete plays in the
marketability of each university, this Part focuses on the equal distribution
of sponsorship and endorsement money generated by individual student-
athletes, and the combined partnership of student-athletes and their
universities.
Section A-School-Sponsored Endorsements
Student-athletes and their universities are an important partnership in
creating endorsements opportunities. Universities allow deserving
student-athletes to participate on university-sponsored athletic teams and
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student-athletes wear the official uniform of the university. Student-
athletes, through their athletic success, increase the marketability and
recognizability of their respective universities. In consideration of this
mutually beneficial relationship, each university that signs a licensing
agreement with an athletic sponsor shall apportion 35% of the proceeds
from these agreements to their athletic departments. The athletic
department shall distribute these proceeds among student-athletes
participating on university-sponsored athletic teams. The remaining 65%
of the proceeds shall be retained by the university for use either in its
athletic department or for its general fund.
Section B-Individual Team Sponsorship
Certain university-sponsored athletic teams receive individual sport
sponsorships due to their marketability and popularity. As discussed in
Subsection A, this popularity stems from a partnership between the
university and the student-athletes on these particular athletic teams.
Therefore, if a certain university-sponsored athletic team receives an
individual endorsement contract, that team shall receive 20% of the
proceeds generated from the contract to be distributed equally among its
student-athletes. The remaining proceeds shall go to the university for use
either in its athletic department or in its general fund.
Section C-Individual Student-Athlete Sponsorship
The academic and athletic achievements of certain student-athletes
enable them to be nationally recognized. This national and local
recognition allows these student-athletes to be valuable endorsers for
certain sponsors. In acknowledgment of these individual opportunities,
each university that is approached by a prospective sponsor shall allow
their student-athletes to endorse the sponsor's products if the restrictions
set forth in this subsection are met: (1) both the student-athlete and the
university shall approve the product and endorsement offered by the
sponsor; (2) the student-athlete is in academic good standing pursuant to
the university's academic standards; (3) the student-athlete is in good
standing pursuant to all of the university's other student conduct standards;
(4) the sponsor agrees to appropriate only five hours of the student-
athlete's time per week for the endorsement of its products (in addition,
during the mid-term and finals period of each quarter or semester, the
sponsor agrees not to appropriate any time from the student-athlete); (5) if
the student-athlete is to travel to events away from the university, the
travel time needed to transport the student-athlete to and from the
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university shall be counted against the weekly allocation of time; (6) the
university and student-athlete must mutually agree to the terms set by the
endorsement agreement; (7) if the student-athlete and/or sponsor violates
any of the restrictions mentioned in this section, the university reserves the
right to cancel the remaining portion of the endorsement contract with the
sponsor.
If the student-athlete, university, and sponsor can agree to these
terms, the sponsor shall be able to contract with the student-athlete to
endorse its products. Twenty percent of all proceeds generated by the
student-athlete pursuant to this contract are to be donated in the student-
athlete's name to the university's general fund. The remaining eighty
percent is to be given to the student-athlete.
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